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An Economic Analysis of the
Guaranty Contract
Avery Wiener Katzt
Guaranty arrangements, in which one person stands as surety for a second person's ob-
ligation to a third, are ubiquitous in commercial transactions and in commercial law. In
recent years, however, scholarly attention to the topic has been scant; and no one has sys-
tematically analyzed this body of law and practice from an economic policy perspective. Ac-
cordingly, this Article attempts to outline the basic economic logic underlying the guaranty
relationship, and applies the results to a variety of specific issues in government policy and
private planning. It poses and answers three main questions: First, why would a creditor
prefer to make a guaranteed loan rather than an unguaranteed one? The answer is not as
obvious as might first appear, given that market competition over credit terms tends to ad-
just the interest rate paid by an individual borrower to reflect the specific default risk that
he presents. Second, given that they bear the residual risk of debtor default, why would
guarantors prefer to guarantee loans rather than make loans directly, thus forgoing the op-
portunity to earn interest payments that could help to compensate for the risk they bear?
Third, even if it is efficient for one creditor to provide funds and another to provide insur-
ance against default, why would the parties prefer to implement this arrangement through
the triangular form of a guaranty, instead of simply having the former creditor lend to the
latter and the latter lend to the ultimate borrower?
INTRODUCTION
Guaranty arrangements, in which one person stands as
surety for a second person's obligation to a third, are ubiquitous
in commercial transactions and in commercial law. They are
probably as common as personal property security or real mort-
gages, and surely of wider application. The interrelated rights
and duties arising out of guaranties and analogous devices com-
prise a substantial part of several distinct bodies of law, including
secured transactions, negotiable instruments, letters of credit,
and contractual assignments. And the practical and legal distinc-
tions among guaranties and alternate transactional forms are
relevant to a wide array of regulatory regimes, including tax,
banking, insurance, and securities law. Indeed, up until the
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1950s, the standard law school curriculum included a required
course on suretyships.1
In recent years, however, the law of guaranties has lan-
guished in a scholarly backwater. Lawyers specializing in the
area lament that the field has "fallen between the cracks,"2 and
that bench, bar, and academy are all ignorant of its content and
practical importance.3 From a purely doctrinal viewpoint, it must
be said, this situation is beginning to change. Three major new
reformulations of guaranty law-the recent revisions of Articles 3
and 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code4 and the just released Re-
statement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty-have been
adopted in the last few years. Practicing lawyers will be forced to
learn or re-learn this field of law, at the risk of malpractice li-
ability. But despite this flourishing of doctrinal reform, and de-
spite the commercial importance of the transactions thus gov-
erned, there has been no systematic theoretical treatment of the
subject from an economic perspective. This omission is especially
noteworthy, moreover, given the substantial body of scholarship
in recent years in the cognate fields of secured transactions and
bankruptcy. While economists and legal scholars have written on
such topics as the economic function of secured debt,6 bankruptcy
law's function in providing incentives for creditors and debtors to
' See Neil B. Cohen, Striking the Balance: The Evolving Nature of Suretyship De-
fenses, 34 Wm & Mary L Rev 1025, 1025 (1993) (noting that suretyships are no longer part
of the law school curriculum). See also Michael L. Closen, Teaching with Recent Decisions:
A Survey of Past and Present Practices, 11 Fla St U L Rev 289, 312-38 (1983) (Author's
representative sample of two-hundred eighty-two legal casebooks published between 1875
and 1982 revealed that suretyship was the subject of three of the sixteen earliest case-
books in the sample, five of the fifty-two casebooks published before 1945, and none of two-
hundred thirty casebooks published after 1945. The most recent suretyship book in
Closen's sample was published in 1942.).
2 Donald J. Rapson, History and Background of the Restatement of Suretyship, 34 Wm
& Mary L Rev 989, 1011 (1993).
' Id at 1012. See also Cohen, 34 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1025-26 (cited in note 1); Ger-
ald T. McLaughlin, Standby Letters of Credit and Guaranties: An Exercise in Cartography,
34 Wm & Mary L Rev 1139, 1139 (1993).
' Articles 3 and 5 were revised in 1990 and 1995. See Douglas G. Baird, Theodore
Eisenberg, and Thomas H. Jackson, eds, Commercial and Debtor-Creditor Law: Selected
Statutes iii (Foundation 1998).
' Restatement of the Law (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty (ALI 1996) ("Restate-
ment 3d"). The new Restatement is intended to supersede its most immediate predecessor,
Restatement of the Law of Security, Division II (ALI 1941). It also covers certain topics
treated in the Restatement of the Law (Second) of Contracts (ALI 1973).
6 See, for example, Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities:A Re-
view of Current Theories, 10 J Legal Stud 1 (1981); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of
Secured Financing, 86 Colum L Rev 901 (1986); Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priori-
ties, 18 J Legal Stud 209 (1989); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of
Imperfect Information, 21 J Legal Stud 225 (1992).
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maximize the value of failing enterprises,7 and the incentive and
notice problems created when creditors take nonpossessory inter-
ests in a debtor's property,8 no one has analyzed the simple and
widespread guaranty contract, for which all of these other devices
are economic substitutes.
This Article outlines the basic economic logic of the guaranty
relationship-its underlying costs and benefits and the key fea-
tures that distinguish it from alternative financial arrangements.
This basic logic is simple, but it has applications across a broad
array of problems faced by commercial and business lawyers.
These problems include determining the optimal scope of surety-
ship rights and defenses, reconciling the treatment of guaranties
across various bodies of commercial law, and helping tax and
regulatory agencies to evaluate transactions based on substance
rather than form.
More importantly, however, a clear account of the economics
of guaranties is essential to explaining why contracting parties
might-and when they should-enter into guaranty relationships
and the specific rights and duties that arise from them. Under-
standing the economics of guaranties is critical to designing an
intelligent regulatory regime for debtor-creditor relations, but it
is even more important for the lawyer engaged in advising clients
how to structure their financial affairs. In most situations, clients
have some leeway to choose whether to pursue their goals either
through guaranties or through alternative devices; in those cases
in which they do decide to enter into guaranties, they typically
are free to contract out of the various default rules that surety-
ship and related fields of law provide.' A good commercial lawyer,
therefore, needs to understand the functional underpinnings of a
transaction in order to help plan it-and in commercial settings,
these underpinnings are economic.
Such a functional perspective is relevant in both private and
public settings. For example, many government policies are in-
See, for example, Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 151-
92 (Harvard 1986); F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 Va L Rev 1393
(1986); Douglas G. Baird and Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining
Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J Legal Stud 311 (1991); Douglas G. Baird, Revis-
itingAuctions in Chapter 11, 36 J L & Econ 633 (1993).
8 See, for example, Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible
Ownership, 12 J Legal Stud 53 (1983); Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Posses-
sion and Ownership:An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 Stan L Rev 175 (1983).
' See, for example, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-102(3) (ALI 1995) ("UCC") (pro-
viding that UCC rules may in general be varied by the parties' agreement, and that obli-
gations of reasonableness, diligence, and good faith, while not disclaimable, can be given
specific content through agreement); Restatement 3d § 6 (cited in note 5) (All rules of
suretyship law can be varied by the parties' agreement.).
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tended to assist debtors, both individual and institutional. These
policies, which include federal student loans, government-backed
home and farm mortgages, bailouts of private entities such as
Chrysler or Lockheed, and international loan guaranties for for-
eign allies such as Israel or Mexico, are motivated by a variety of
economic and political considerations. Whatever the goals of such
programs, however, it is in the public interest that they be pur-
sued through an efficient transactional form. To take just one ex-
ample, in recent years federal support for education lending has
shifted from a program of guaranteed student loans toward one of
direct student loans, on the supposed rationale of greater admin-
istrative efficiency. ° The Clinton administration has favored yet
a third alternative, subsidizing student loans through the income
tax system." An economic analysis of guaranties is necessary to
determine which of these arrangements is indeed most efficient.
Nonetheless, the arguments that follow may well be of
greater utility to business lawyers designing individual transac-
tions than to legislators, judges, or other regulators. In my view,
this is a strength of the analysis rather than a weakness. As I
have argued elsewhere, contemporary legal scholars-even those
associated with the relatively market-oriented perspective of law
and economics-have focused disproportionately on analyzing
public policies and have addressed themselves primarily to gov-
ernment decisionmakers. 2 Because private actors also care about
efficiency and distribution in ordering their affairs, the theoreti-
cal insights of economics are at least as valuable to them as they
are to public officials. Just as the citizens of the United States
must decide whether their government should lend funds to the
government of Mexico directly, guarantee loans made to Mexico
by a third-party lender, or leave Mexico to its own financial de-
vices, so must a commercial bank decide whether to demand that
a credit applicant provide a co-signer or whether to issue a
standby letter of credit for an existing customer seeking addi-
10 For surveys and critiques of recent changes and proposed changes in federal policy
toward student loans, see generally Evelyn Brody, Paying Back Your Country Through In-
come-Contingent Student Loans, 31 San Diego L Rev 449 (1994); Dennis Zimmerman and
Barbara Miles, Substituting Direct Government Lending for Guaranteed Student Loans:
How Budget Rules Distort Economic Decisionmaking, 47 Natl Tax J 773, 773-80 (1994);
Barbara Miles and Dennis Zimmerman, Reducing Costs and Improving Efficiency in the
Student Loan Program, 50 Natl Tax J 541, 541-48 (1997).
" See Brody, 31 San Diego L Rev at 453-54 (cited in note 10) (discussing President
Clinton's support for the proposal and examining the optimal structure for income-
contingent repayment of student loans).
See Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U Pa L Rev 1745, 1748
(1996).
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tional funds from another lender. The same set of functional eco-
nomic issues apply whether one is making public or private pol-
icy.
In the succeeding sections of this Article, therefore, I lay out
the basic economics of suretyships and guaranties. The Article
poses three main questions. First, why would a creditor prefer to
make a guaranteed loan rather than an unguaranteed one? The
answer is not as obvious as it first might appear, given that mar-
ket competition over credit terms tends to adjust the interest rate
paid by an individual borrower to reflect the specific default risk
that he or she presents. 3 Second, since guarantors bear the re-
sidual risk of debtor default, why would they prefer to guarantee
loans rather than make loans themselves, thus forgoing the op-
portunity to earn interest payments that could help compensate
for the risk of default? Third, even if it is efficient for one lender
to provide funds and another to provide insurance against the
borrower's default, why would the parties prefer to accomplish
such an arrangement through the three-corner form of a guar-
anty instead of simply having the former lend to the latter and
the latter on-lend to the ultimate borrower?
In brief, the answers to these questions are as follows. First,
and most straightforwardly, creditors should prefer to make
guaranteed loans when, and only when, there is a potential guar-
antor who can monitor the debtor more cheaply than the creditor
can. Monitoring in this regard should be understood broadly to
include any and all activities that reduce the expected cost of
nonpayment, including up-front investigation of the debtor's
credit history and financial situation, supervision of the debtor
and his project during the life of the loan, and enforcement, col-
lection, and salvage in the event of default.
Second, the person who is the lowest-cost monitor will prefer
to act as guarantor, rather than as primary lender, when, and
only when, her cost of liquidity-that is, the transaction costs she
must pay to convert her assets into an acceptable means of ready
payment-is greater than that of potential third-party lenders. In
essence, suretyship is an economic arrangement in which one
party specializes in providing liquid funds and another special-
izes in providing informational monitoring, collection services,
and insurance.
Third, and perhaps least obviously, guaranties are more effi-
cient than on-lending or other forms of intermediation when, and
See, for example, Schwartz, 10 J Legal Stud at 7-9 (cited in note 6) (demonstrating
how this adjustment would work in an idealized market for secured credit).
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only when, the party who provides liquid funds attaches a higher
value to the option to proceed directly against the ultimate bor-
rower (in the event of default) than does the party who provides
monitoring and collection services. And this will be the case ei-
ther when the latter's comparative advantage is less than com-
plete (for instance, if she is good at underwriting and monitoring,
but less good at collection or salvage), or when there is a signifi-
cant chance that the monitor herself will turn out to be insolvent
or uncollectable.
To develop these ideas more fully, however, requires some
groundwork. Thus, the next Section presents some background on
the subject of guaranties. It sets out an array of typical situations
involving guaranty relationships, outlines the various bodies of
law that govern such situations, and summarizes the main ques-
tions and unresolved controversies that arise in those legal fields.
Section II, which forms the heart of this Article, then compares
the costs and benefits of guaranties with those of related transac-
tional forms and discusses why (and when) contracting parties
would-and should-prefer one type of transactional form to an-
other. Section III applies this theoretical analysis to two ques-
tions of public policy and private planning: (1) how should the
government operate when it wishes to subsidize borrowing, and
(2) how should a commercial bank structure its risks and duties
when it issues a standby letter of credit. The Conclusion summa-
rizes the analysis and suggests some further applications to
analogous problems in law, policy, and planning.
I. THE LAW OF GUARANTIES AND SURETYSHIPS:
A SENSE OF THE TERRAIN
The number and variety of transactions that include or imply
guaranty relationships are vast. In order to situate the problem
in a business and policy context, this Section surveys a sample of
such relationships and summarizes the legal issues that arise
from them. Readers familiar with this background material or
eager to get to the main theoretical points of the Article may wish
to skip directly to the next Section. Even a brief perusal of the
following examples, however, will help to convey the scope and
practical relevance of the analysis to follow.
A. The Standard Guaranty Relationship
Guaranties and suretyships take many forms, but the es-
sence of the relationship is a contract among three parties: a
creditor (C) who is owed a duty, a debtor (D) who owes the duty,
[66:47
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and a guarantor or surety (G) who promises to perform or pay
damages on D's behalf.'4 Depending on the context and the appli-
cable body of law, however, these three parties are designated by
different labels, as illustrated in Table 1. In the terminology of
the Third Restatement, for example, C is the "obligee," D the
"primary obligor," and G the "secondary obligor." 5 As this termi-
nology suggests, ordinarily D is expected to bear the burden of
performance, and if G is called upon to perform or pay in D's
stead, it is ordinarily expected that D will reimburse her if he is
able. 6 The arrangement can be achieved through a single con-
tract or through multiple contracts; in the latter case, G may con-
tract with D alone, with C alone, or with both. A guaranty may
even be created without the knowledge of D or C, though in this
case the parties' rights and duties will be altered in order to pro-
tect the uninformed party. This simple model of the relationship
between C, D, and G is general enough to encompass a wide vari-
ety of business and policy contexts, as the following examples il-
lustrate.
Table 1. Terminology of the Guaranty Relationship
in Alternative Contexts.
C D G
Restatement of Obligee Primary obligor Secondary
Suretyship obligor
Negotiable Holder Accommodated Accommodation
instrument party party
Sale of Assignee Account debtor Assignor
accounts
Letter of Beneficiary Applicant Issuer
credit
Lease Landlord Subtenant Primary tenant
assumption I I
" Traditionally, a "suretyship" describes a relationship in which the guarantor and
debtor are jointly and severally liable for the underlying obligation, while under a "guar-
anty" the debtor's actual default is a condition precedent to the guarantor's obligation to
perform. See Restatement 3d § 15 (cited in note 5). Because of variations among the indi-
vidual provisions of guaranty and suretyship contracts, however, the two terms overlap
substantially in actual practice. Id § I comment c and § 15 comment b. For this reason, I
will use the terms interchangeably in this Article, except where the question of a condition
precedent to guarantor liability is specifically relevant to the discussion.
' Id § 1(a).
16 Id § 22. In order to avoid ambiguity when discussing generic guaranty transactions,
I adopt the convention of referring to debtors and primary obligors .with male pronouns,
guarantors and sureties with female pronouns, and creditors with neuter pronouns.
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1. Intrafamilial guarantees.
D, a college senior who is about to graduate and take his first
job, wants to buy a car. He has enough money for the down pay-
ment, but has not yet established a credit history. His only bor-
rowing experience consists of student loans, which will not be-
come due for six months and which he has not yet begun to repay.
Accordingly, only finance companies that specialize in lending to
risky debtors will be willing to deal with D on his own, and those
companies' interest rates are substantially higher than the mar-
ket average (and the rates available to someone with a longer
credit history). If D can find someone with an established credit
record to guarantee his loan, however, he will be eligible for more
conventional and cheaper financing from C, a local bank. D ar-
ranges with his mother, G, to provide such a guaranty by co-
signing his loan application and by co-signing the promissory
note that D must execute in C's favor before receiving funds.
2. Intercorporate guaranties.
D, a limited liability corporation, needs financing to mod-
ernize its capital equipment. C, one of D's longstanding suppliers,
is willing to lend D the necessary funds, but is concerned about
D's leveraged capital structure and relative lack of marketable
assets. Accordingly, as a condition of the loan, C requests and ob-
tains guaranties from D's parent company, G1, and from Gl's sole
shareholder, G2. In the event that D defaults, these guaranties
allow C to access assets that ordinarily could not be reached
without piercing the corporate veil, thus reducing C's risk and
lowering the interest rate it will charge."
3. Standby letters of credit.
D, a software design company, wishes to borrow funds for a
new project from C, a commercial bank with whom it has not
dealt previously. Because a regular loan would entail a new
credit investigation and require C to familiarize itself with a new
type of business, C would have to charge D more than the prime
rate of interest. C, however, will loan the funds to D at or below
the prime rate if D approaches G, a bank with whom it has a
longstanding relationship, and obtains a standby letter of credit
1 In the commercial setting, furthermore, it is common for such guaranties to be ac-
companied by other forms of lender protection. For example, both the underlying obliga-
tion and the guaranties might be secured by a purchase money security interest in the
new equipment or other real or personal collateral.
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naming C as beneficiary. This letter of credit provides that if C
presents G with documents attesting that D has defaulted on C's
loan, C will be entitled to draw on the credit up to an agreed
limit. In exchange for a fee proportional to the amount of the
standby credit, G issues the letter to D, who presents it to C in
exchange for the desired funds. 8
4. Construction suretyships.
D, a construction contractor, submits the lowest bid on a job
to build a new school on a site owned by C, a municipal school
district. As a condition of awarding D the contract, however, C
requires D to obtain a third-party surety bond. D purchases such
a bond from G, a company specializing in providing such assur-
ances. The bond obligates G to complete the job if D does not, and
also obligates G to pay all outstanding amounts owed to subcon-
tractors and suppliers of materials, to remove any construction or
mechanics' liens on the property at the conclusion of the project,
and to pay any penal sums owed to C under the original contract.
The surety bond also provides that all funds that C may owe D
under the contract will stand as collateral for any claims that G
may acquire against D. Thus, if G completes the job in D's stead,
G, not D, will be entitled to receive the contract price. 9
5. Recourse assignments of accounts, chattel paper,
or instruments.
G, a dealer in consumer appliances, sells a refrigerator to D
on credit. G then assigns her interest in D's account to C, a factor
(in other words, a company in the business of buying such ac-
counts), in exchange for an immediate cash payment. The under-
lying consumer debt may also be secured by a security interest in
the refrigerator, in which case the assigned contract is referred to
as "chattel paper"; alternatively or additionally, the debt may be
embodied in the form of a negotiable promissory note signed by D
", The parties may, if they wish, dispense with any requirement of attesting docu-
ments; this is called a "demand" or "clean" letter of credit. See, for example, McLaughlin,
34 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1141-43 (cited in note 3); Bernard S. Wheble, "Problem Chil-
dren"-Standby Letters of Credit and Simple First Demand Guarantees, 24 Ariz L Rev
301, 313 (1982); Dean Pawlowic, Standby Letters of Credit: Review and Update, 23 UCC L
J 391, 399400 (1991); Henry Harfield, Guaranties, Standby Letters of Credit, and Ugly
Ducklings, 26 UCC L J 195, 198-99 (1994).
"Performance bonds are a typical provision in government contracts at the state and
local level, and are required for all federal public works projects under the Miller Act, 40
USC § 270a(a) (1994). For a general discussion of surety bonds, see T. Scott Leo, The Con-
struction Contract Surety and Some Suretyship Defenses, 34 Wm & Mary L Rev 1225,
1233-40 (1993).
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as maker and indorsed by G over to C. In any of these cases, how-
ever, the amount of cash that C pays G for the account, chattel
paper, or instrument will be less than its face value. This dis-
count reflects the facts that payment will be delayed and that the
factor must service the account and incur costs of collection. The
assignment, however, is on a recourse basis: to the extent that
the accounts are uncollectible (or, more generally, to the extent
that the shortfall in collections exceeds some agreed amount), G
must refund C's payment and retake possession of the bad ac-
count, effectively rendering G a guarantor of the underlying debt.
A similar analysis applies to assignments of contractual rights
more generally, so long as the assignment is with recourse."
6. Joint and several liability.
A single transaction may involve multiple guarantors and
multiple debtors, with some parties acting as debtors for some
obligations and as guarantors for others.2 To illustrate, suppose
two law students, A and B, decide to lease an apartment together.
The lease contract makes each tenant jointly and severally liable
for the entire monthly rent of $1,000. The students agree between
themselves, however, that A will take the larger bedroom and pay
$600 per month while B will take the smaller bedroom and pay
$400 per month. These two agreements-the lease contract and
the side agreement between A and B-together render A and B
both debtors and guarantors with respect to their landlord. As to
the $600 rent on the larger bedroom, A is debtor and B is guaran-
tor; as to the $400 rent on the smaller bedroom, B is debtor and A
is guarantor. This is so whether or not the landlord knows of the
students' side agreement; indeed, one advantage of such an ar-
rangement is that the landlord does not need to keep track of how
its tenants apportion the lease obligations among themselves.
7. Government-sponsored enterprises.
A number of U.S. government-chartered institutions partici-
pate directly in credit markets, in some instances as direct lend-
ers and in others as guarantors of loans extended by private
lenders.22 Such institutions include the Federal National Mort-
' For examples, see D. Benjamin Beard, Suretyship on the Fringe: Suretyship by Op-
eration of Law and by Analogy, 34 Wm & Mary L Rev 1157, 1165-93 (1993).
1 For a description of the rights and duties that multiple debtors and guarantors may
owe each other in a single transaction, see Restatement 3d §§ 52-61 (cited in note 5)
("Multiple Secondary Obligors").
' See Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on Government Sponsored Enterprises
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gage Association ("Fannie Mae"), the Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), the Farm Credit System, and
the Student Loan Marketing Association ("Sallie Mae"). While
these entities technically are not governmental agencies, and
thus have no formal legal claim on assets of the federal govern-
ment, historically all were created and periodically infused with
federal funds, and they continue to be subject to substantial fed-
eral regulation. Due to their political popularity and their impor-
tance to the national economy, if any one of these institutions
were in danger of failure, Congress would come under substantial
pressure to rescue it from default. In an informal political sense,
then, U.S. taxpayers stand as the ultimate guarantors of debts
owed by these institutions; for this reason, investors are willing
to lend to these entities at lower interest rates than they would
demand from a comparable private borrower.'
8. Guaranties between independent national sovereigns.
On several recent occasions, the U.S. government has as-
sisted allied countries in obtaining private sector financing for
their national debts. Such assistance operates both as a form of
foreign aid and as a tool for pursuing other foreign policy objec-
tives. For instance, in the fall of 1992, the U.S. guaranteed $10
billion in loans to the Israeli government for the purpose of fi-
nancing housing for emigrants from the former Soviet Union;
similarly, in January 1995, the U.S. guaranteed $40 billion in
loans to Mexico as part of an international aid package designed
to prevent the Mexican government from defaulting on existing
obligations after market pressures forced it to devalue the peso.
In both instances, the loan guaranties were the subject of sub-
stantial public controversy, on both fiscal and foreign policy
grounds.24 Similarly, the U.S. government has routinely guaran-
teed smaller loans to foreign governments for specific purchases
(1990); Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on Government-Sponsored Enterprises
(1991) ('1991 Report"). Both reports discuss the potential financial problems raised by
these entities' operations and recommend associated reforms.
2 1991 Report at 1-2 (cited in note 22).
"See, for example, John Quigley, Loan Guarantees, Israeli Settlements, and Middle
East Peace, 25 Vand J Transnatl L 547, 568-72 (1992) (arguing that such loan guaranties,
as well as other forms of U.S. aid to Israel, facilitate and may constitute violations of in-
ternational law and diminish prospects for peace in the Middle East); James D. Humphrey
H1, Note, Foreign Affairs Powers and 'The First Crisis of the 21st Century": Congressional
vs. Executive Authority and the Stabilization Plan for Mexico, 17 Mich J Intl L 181, 201-10
(1995) (describing and analyzing the political contest between the President and Congress
over Mexican guaranties).
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such as arms sales, both for foreign policy reasons and to promote
the commercial interests of American exporters."
B. The Law Governing Guaranties
Because a guaranty relationship can be achieved through a
variety of contractual devices, the precise body of law that gov-
erns the relationship will depend on the particular device used.
Generally, the parties' relationship will be governed by the com-
mon law of contracts and suretyship, the latter of which has re-
cently been recatalogued by the Third Restatement. If a guaran-
tor (G) acquires her status by making or indorsing a negotiable
instrument, however, the parties' relationship will be governed
first by Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), which
provides special rules for "accommodation parties," and next by
any common law rules that the UCC does not specifically dis-
place.26 If the guaranty takes the form of a standby letter of
credit, which is routine when the guarantor is a commercial bank,
the relationship is governed in part by Article 5 of the UCC, in
part by the common law, and-if the transaction has an interna-
tional element-in part by the International Chamber of Com-
merce's Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Cred-
its. If the guarantor provides collateral to secure the underlying
secondary obligation, or if the guaranty arises out of a sale or as-
signment of accounts, then UCC Article 9 governs the transac-
tion. Finally, as indicated above, if the U.S. government or U.S.-
sponsored institutions guarantee a loan, then federal statutes-
and, ultimately, implicit political contracts among Congress, the
executive branch, international actors, and American voters-
provide the basis for liability.2"
' See, for example, Jonathan E. Sanford, Foreign Debts to the U.S. Government: Re-
cent Rescheduling and Forgiveness, 28 Geo Wash J Intl L & Econ 345, 361-63 (1995).
See UCC § 3-419 ("Instruments Signed for Accommodation"); UCC § 3-605 ("Dis-
charge of Indorsers and Accommodation Parties"). These sections apply only if an indica-
tion of G's guaranty appears on the face of the instrument being guaranteed. In this case,
G is an "accommodation party" and D an "accommodated party." "Off-the-paper" guaran-
ties, conversely, are governed solely by the common law. See generally Neil B. Cohen,
Suretyship Principles in the New Article 3: Clarifications and Substantive Changes, 42 Ala
L Rev 595 (1991) (discussing general principles embodied in Article 3).
See UCC § 5-103 ("Scope"); UCC § 5-108 ("Issuer Rights and Obligations"). For a
survey of international law and practice in the area of letters of credit, see Boris Kozol-
chyk, Bank Guarantees and Letters of Credit: Time for a Return to the Fold, 11 U Pa J Intl
Bus L 1, 15-67 (1989); ICC Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 19-24
(ICC 1993) ("Liabilities and Responsibilities"). The extent to which common law principles
continue to govern letters of credit is a matter of dispute, as Section HILB discusses.
"The above survey is far from exhaustive. For instance, a guaranty relationship could
also be covered by state and federal statutes regulating the sale of financial options, since
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Whatever body of law, commercial practice, or political un-
derstanding creates the guaranty, the functional issues are much
the same. Guaranties are a response to potential moral hazard
and adverse selection problems: they help protect creditors
against some of the risks of debtor misbehavior or insolvency by
shifting those risks to guarantors. In so doing, guaranties enlist
the guarantor's efforts in reducing or managing those risks. As
with any other insurance arrangement, however, guaranties
themselves are subject to various types of moral hazard and ad-
verse selection. Each party to the transaction can impose losses
on the others by failing to take precautions or by withholding in-
formation. For example, guarantors have the power to hurt credi-
tors (and debtors as well) by incautiously offering guaranties
where the underlying financial situation does not warrant a loan,
or by failing to monitor the debtor after money has been lent.
Creditors may hurt guarantors (and debtors) by provoking debt-
ors to default, by failing to collect from the debtor when possible,
and by impairing the guarantor's ability to seek recourse from the
debtor after the fact. Debtors can injure guarantors and creditors
alike by taking excessive risks and making inadequate efforts to
meet their primary obligations. Moreover, the very creation of a
suretyship can itself raise incentive problems, particularly when
one of the parties to the underlying primary contract had not an-
ticipated that a three-corner relationship would arise.29
Because of these common functional problems, all bodies of
formal guaranty law provide the three archetypical parties with
various rights and duties that, on the whole, are designed to dis-
courage opportunism and encourage all persons involved to take
reasonable precautions against economic loss. All regimes of
guaranty law provide a default rule giving G a right of recourse
against D in the event D does not perform his primary obligation
and G has to make good on her guaranty.
one common way to provide the functional equivalent of a guaranty is for G to sell to C a
put option that gives her the right to collect from G. C will subsequently wish to exercise
the option if and only if the expected value of D's performance falls below the exercise
price. If the debtor becomes insolvent, various state rules of debtor-creditor law including
the law of fraudulent conveyances will govern; and if the debtor files for federal bank-
ruptcy protection, a variety of Bankruptcy Code provisions will also apply-the most im-
portant of which deal with preferences and fraudulent conveyances.
' For instance, a creditor who privately and unilaterally arranges for a guaranty may
substantially increase the debtor's cost of compliance under the primary contract, multi-
plying the number of persons to whom he owes duties of care or disclosure. Similar prob-
lems arise when a creditor transfers its interest in the debtor's account to a distant and
unfamiliar assignee, or when a debtor delegates performance of contractual duties to an
untested person with whom the creditor will nonetheless be obligated to make reasonable
efforts to deal.
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The common law of suretyship, for example, protects this
right of recourse in three ways. First, G is entitled to the right of
reimbursement for any funds she actually pays out, plus reason-
able expenses.30 Second, and alternatively, if G satisfies D's obli-
gation to C in full, she is equitably subrogated to C's rights
against D." This subrogation right is valuable if C has some spe-
cial status (such as that of holder in due course) that gives her
immunity against claims and defenses that D could otherwise
raise (and specifically, that D could raise against G). It is also
useful if C has priority over D's other creditors through a lien or
other interest in specific property. Finally, G has a right to D's
performance itself-that is, the right of exoneration." This last
right is valuable because G can assert it before her duty to pay
anything out has arisen, and such early action may increase the
chances that D will still perform. Depending on the circum-
stances, the right of exoneration may entitle G to receive specific
performance from D, pursue an action against D for creating in-
security along the lines of the right of adequate assurances under
Section 2-609 of the UCC, or declare the contract in default.33
Conversely, guaranty law provides a number of rules de-
signed to protect guarantors against creditor action that materi-
ally increases guarantor risk. Thus, if the debtor's breach was oc-
casioned by a countervailing breach by C-as when a credit buyer
of goods withholds payment after discovering that the goods are
unmerchantable-the traditional common law rule permits G to
treat C's breach as a defense to her secondary liability to the
same extent it would provide a defense to D's primary liability. 4
Similarly, she may be able to assert D's unrelated claims against
C by way of set-off. 5
Beyond such derivative claims, G is also entitled to raise cer-
tain rights and defenses against C that D could not raise-the so-
called "suretyship defenses." For instance, if C modifies D's un-
derlying obligation, extends D's time for performance, unreason-
ably refuses a tender of performance by either D or G, or fails to
supervise or preserve rights against collateral or against co-
sureties or sub-sureties, G may avoid liability to the extent she
Restatement 3d § 22 (cited in note 5). See also UCC § 3-419(e); UCC § 5-114.
31 Restatement 3d § 29 (cited in note 5). A party that is equitably subrogated to an-
other acquires the legal rights and remedies of the latter.
Id § 21 & comment i.
Id § 21 comment k. See also UCC § 2-609 ("Right to Adequate Assurance of Per-
formance).
Restatement 3d § 34 (cited in note 5).
Id § 36.
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suffers resulting loss. 6 Indeed, if C fails to disclose events that
would support a good suretyship defense under conditions where
it should know that G is ignorant of such events, G has a right to
recover any amounts she has unnecessarily paid out."
The specific content of these various rights and duties, how-
ever, depends both upon the particular factual setting and the
governing body of law. The substance of suretyship defenses and
the duties of care owed by the creditor, for instance, are different
under the common law of suretyship, Articles 3 and 9 of the UCC,
and the law of letters of credit."8 The remedies that follow from a
breach of C's duty to G are also different, 9 as are the procedures
for contracting around the default rules within various legal re-
gimes. 0 As a result, the content of guaranty obligations depends
primarily on the parties' choice of transactional form. A person
guaranteeing a promise embodied in a promissory note can opt
into the rules of Article 3 by signing the note as an accommoda-
tion party41 or into the rules of the common law of suretyship by
signing a separate written agreement. She can opt into Article 5
by casting her guaranty in the form of a letter of credit or opt into
Article 9 by offering specific property as collateral. Even within
these broader transactional forms, furthermore, she can vary her
rights and duties by using particular terms of art, relying on the
Article 3 distinction between guaranty of collection and guaranty
Id §§ 37-46.
Id § 47.
For instance, while the creditor's release of the debtor presumptively releases the
guarantor under the traditional common law of suretyship, it does not operate as a release
under Article 3. Compare id § 39, with UCC § 3-605(b). Similarly, under the common law,
the guarantor can raise most defenses against liability that are available to the debtor, in-
cluding failure of consideration, breach of warranty, and the like. Under Article 3, how-
ever, such defenses would not be good against a holder in due course, and under new Arti-
cle 5, they would be good only to the extent that they amounted to material fraud under
UCC § 5-109. On these differences, see Cohen, 34 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1037-40 (cited in
note 1) (discussing defenses under Article 3); Peter A. Alces, An Essay on Independence,
Interdependence, and the Suretyship Principle, 1993 U Ill L Rev 447, 465-76 (discussing
and comparing defenses under Article 5 and the common law).
Compare, for example, Restatement 3d §§ 37, 42 (cited in note 5), with UCC § 3-
605(e), (f).
, Compare Restatement 3d § 6 (cited in note 5), and UCC § 3-605(i) (allowing guaran-
tor to waive defenses based on suretyship and impairment of collateral), with UCC § 9-
501(3) (limiting ability of guarantor and creditor to vary their rights and duties with
respect to disposition of collateral prior to default; also barring the parties from varying
other rights and duties).
4 Of course, the note must also be negotiable for Article 3 to apply. Renald J. Mann,
Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L Rev 951, 962-85
(1997), presents empirical evidence that such negotiable promissory notes are relatively
rare in modern business transactions.
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of payment,42 or by providing specific conditions for transfer and
presentment in a letter of credit.4' By issuing a limited rather
than an unlimited guaranty, she can mimic various risk-sharing
devices common in insurance markets, including liability caps,
deductibles,. and copayments." And apart from a few exceptions,
she can contract around the default rules of suretyship whatever
the applicable legal regime.4s Indeed, such waivers of default are
the norm in many lending markets.46
To decide whether to cast one's financial transactions in the
form of a guaranty at all, to choose which regime of guaranty law
to opt into, and to decide whether to accept the various default
rules of that regime, accordingly, it is necessary to understand
the economic purposes that guaranty contracts serve. In the next
Section, I present an account of why guaranties exist-why and
when it is desirable to divide the functions of providing funds and
of bearing the residual risks of debtor default between two differ-
ent parties, and why and when it is desirable to use a three-
corner conditional arrangement when doing so.
II. GUARANTIES AND THEIR ALTERNATiVES: THE CHOICE OF
TRANSACTIONAL FORM
In this Section, I discuss why parties would or should want to
use guaranties, in contrast to the alternatives of unguaranteed
lending and direct intermediation. The discussion proceeds as
follows: first, I develop a simple model outlining the costs of
credit, which include the lender's time value of money, monitor-
ing efforts, the cost of liquid funds, and the probability that the
debtor will default. Using this model, I show that guaranteed
lending is more efficient than unguaranteed lending when G's
monitoring and collection costs are sufficiently lower than C's,
and C's liquidity costs are sufficiently lower than G's. I then go on
UCC § 3-419(d).
' Id § 5-112 (providing that the beneficiary warrants that all necessary conditions of
the credit have been complied with when she transfers a letter of credit or demands pay-
ment thereunder).
" See Alces, 1993 U Ill L Rev at 457-58 (cited in note 38). The nature of these limits
depends on the type of guaranty used. For instance, if the guaranty takes the form of a put
option on the underlying debt, the exercise price of the option implicitly determines the
deductible. A face-value exercise price is equivalent to no deductible; lower exercise prices
imply higher deductibles.
"See, for example, Restatement 3d § 6 (cited in note 5); UCC § 1-102. But see UCC §
9-501(3) for some possible exceptions.
"See Cohen, 34 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1042-43 (cited in note 1); Restatement 3d § 48
comment a (cited in note 5); Lynn M. LoPucki, et al, Commercial Transactions: A Systems
Approach 514-19 (Aspen 1998).
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to show that guaranties are more efficient than intermediation
when C places a sufficiently higher value on having a direct claim
against D than do G's other creditors and stakeholders.
The discussion focuses on the criterion of economic effi-
ciency-that is, of maximizing the net surplus, monetary or oth-
erwise, that results from the transaction. In most business deal-
ings, the parties are motivated in substantial part by the prospect
of economic gain and have the opportunity to plan their arrange-
ments carefully and with the assistance of professional advisers.
Because the law also allows them substantial leeway in shaping
their contractual relationships, they have both the incentive and
the ability to conserve on transaction costs. Thus, an efficiency
analysis operates in this setting as both an explanatory theory of
commercial actors' behavior and as a normative benchmark by
which to judge their efforts."
Before we begin the main discussion, however, two prefatory
remarks regarding its scope are in order. First, although I often
assume that the guarantor receives a direct benefit from the
guaranty transaction, the analysis to follow applies equally well
to guaranties that are formally uncompensated. Many, if not
most, uncompensated guarantors have an economic interest in
the success of the enterprise being guaranteed; even those with
purely donative intent ordinarily will wish to offer their support
in an efficient manner."
' The usual caveats to such an approach, of course, will apply. See, for example, A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide
to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 Harv L Rev 1655 (1974) (discussing and criti-
cizing the techifical assumptions of efficiency analysis); Arthur M. Okun, Equality and Ef-
ficiency: The Big Tradeoff (Brookings 1975) (discussing the tension between efficiency and
distributional equity); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth A Value?, 9 J Legal Stud 191 (1980)
(critiquing efficiency from a perspective of liberal individualism); Richard A. Posner, The
Economics Of Justice 48-115 (Harvard 1983) (defending efficiency as normatively prefer-
able to utilitarianism); Jules L. Coleman, Markets, Morals, and the Law 95-132 (Cam-
bridge 1988) (critiquing efficiency criterion from the perspective of classical utilitarian-
ism); and the various critiques surveyed in Avery Wiener Katz, ed, Foundations of the
Economic Approach to Law 311-69 (Oxford 1998).
Compare, for example, Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Altruism and De-
ferred Gifts, 20 J Legal Stud 401, 409-19 (1991) (defining an efficient gift as one that
minimizes unnecessary transaction costs while maximizing the value that the beneficiary
actually receives from an outlay of given cost), with Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Prom-
ises in Economics and Law, 6 J Legal Stud 411, 414-24 (1977) (explaining many formally
donative promises in terms of self-interest). More specifically, there are numerous ways to
assist a person in need of credit if that is one's purpose. One can lend the intended benefi-
ciary funds at a below-market interest rate, guarantee his loan with another creditor, or
directly subsidize his interest expeditures (perhaps an amount equal to the differential
charged between high risk and low risk loans). Depending on the particular circumstances
of the beneficiary and the donor, these various arrangements will have different costs and
benefits, so that a guaranty may or may not be the most cost effective form of assistance.
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Second, and more importantly, my focus on efficiency is not
intended to suggest that individual profit maximization always
leads to a socially efficient outcome, or that actual guaranties are
always motivated by efficiency considerations. On the contrary,
the standard litany of market failures-scale economies, monop-
oly, externalities, and imperfect information-are just as relevant
here as in any other exchange setting. For instance, if guarantors
mistakenly underestimate the relative costs of making a guar-
anty, as some gratuitous guarantors surely do, private contract-
ing will lead to too many guaranties and, conversely, to too few
interest subsidies or direct low-interest loans.49 Similarly, the
parties to a credit transaction may in many instances find other-
wise inefficient arrangements to be privately profitable just be-
cause those arrangements allow the principals to impose exter-
nalities on nonparties. I will discuss such externalities, as well as
analogous nonefficiency rationales for guaranties such as tax, ac-
counting, and regulatory considerations, in Section II.B below.
A. Guaranties, Unguaranteed Lending, and Intermediation
Consider a situation where a would-be debtor, D, seeks funds
from two potential creditors, C and G. There are several ways to
provide funds to D, the three main types of which are depicted in
Figure 1, where arrows indicate the flow of credit. First, D could
borrow from C alone, leaving G out of the transaction entirely;
this possibility is depicted in part (a) of the figure. Second, D
could borrow from C and supplement it with a guaranty from G.
This possibility is depicted in part (b) of the figure, with the dot-
ted arrows indicating that the extension of credit is contingent
rather than unconditional. Specifically, if D does not repay the
As I will show below, the factors that determine whether a guaranty is efficient in the con-
text of a gift are analogous to those that determine its efficiency in the context of a bar-
gain.
" Indeed, several important doctrines of suretyship law are motivated primarily by
concern for the incautious or noncalculating guarantor. These include the special Statute
of Frauds for suretyships, see Restatement 3d § 11 & comment a (cited in note 5), and the
greater procedural and substantive scope given to suretyship defenses in the donative con-
text, see, for example, id § 49 & comment b (providing that compensated, but not gratui-
tous, guarantors bear the burden of proof with regard to the extent of economic loss re-
sulting from the creditor's improper actions). Modern consumer protection law offers addi-
tional safeguards for casual guarantors. See, for example, the FTC's Credit Practices
Rules, especially those codified in 16 CFR § 444.3(a) (1998) ("Unfair or Deceptive Cosigner
Practices"). In addition, many courts have shown special solicitude to the unique form-
contract and boilerplate problems arising from guaranty contracts, and have interpreted
claims against guarantors strictly and suretyship defenses broadly. See generally Peter A.
Alces, The Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Commercial Transactions, 61
NC L Rev 655, 660-61 (1983).
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primary loan, then G will become indebted to C and D will be-
come indebted to G. Third, G could borrow from C and then on-
lend to D, a possibility depicted in part (c) of the figure. In this
case both obligations are unconditional. C would then have no di-
rect claim against D, though G's claim against D would be one of
the assets to which C could ultimately look for satisfaction if G
falls into default with C."
For each of these three possibilities there exists an alterna-
tive and symmetric arrangement with G and C switching places.
For instance, D could borrow the entire amount from G rather
than from C, and so on. Additionally, the parties could provide
part of the desired funds through one form and the rest through
another, as when C and G separately and independently lend D
half of what he requests. These further alternatives are omitted
from Figure 1 for the sake of simplicity, but they are discussed
below where relevant.
Figure 1. Alternative Configurations of Credit
C C ------------ G C
G
D D4
D
(a) Direct Lending (b) Guaranty (c) Intermediation
1. The cost of credit in an unguaranteed loan.
The precise costs of credit will vary depending on the form of
the transaction. In the simple case where C lends directly to D,
there are three main components of credit cost. The first is the
marginal cost that C bears in obtaining liquid funds to lend, a
cost that can be further divided into two subcomponents. The first
of these subcomponents is the pure time value of money-the ex-
' The Bankruptcy Code provides that, as of the commencement of bankruptcy, all of a
debtor's legal or equitable property interests, including unpaid accounts receivable, be-
come property of the bankruptcy estate, to be collected and managed by the trustee for the
benefit of creditors. 11 USC § 541 (1994). In addition, the trustee has the discretion under
id § 365 to assume any executory contract rights of the debtor.
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plicit or implicit interest rate, ic, that C must pay for obtaining
such funds, whether by drawing down its own savings, reducing
loans to other borrowers, or engaging in financial intermediation
with other potential lenders. The second subcomponent is C's
marginal cost of liquidity, 1c. Liquidity should be understood here
in a Coasean sense-I use the term to denote the transaction
costs that C must incur to convert its assets into a readily accept-
able medium of exchange." If, for example, all of C's assets hap-
pen to be tied up in a parcel of real estate, its liquidity costs
would consist of all the expenditures and opportunity costs asso-
ciated with mortgaging or selling the parcel, including commis-
sions, appraisals, surveys, title insurance, transfer taxes, attor-
neys' fees, and the like. The extent of such costs will of course de-
pend on the particular form in which C's assets are held. If C's
assets take the form of certificates of deposit, its liquidity costs
may be limited to the interest penalties it incurs for early with-
drawal; if C's entire wealth is held in the form of cash in a mat-
tress, its immediate liquidity cost will be close to zero. In both
cases, however, it is still necessary to consider the additional
transaction costs that C will have to incur if it loans out all its
cash and has to borrow more funds in an emergency, discounted
by the probability of that event.2
The second main component of C's credit cost is the transac-
tion cost of dealing with D. These transaction costs include the
ordinary incidents of processing a loan: underwriting; time spent
by loan officers, clerks, and other administrators; drafting and
executing a loan contract; and servicing the loan after it is made.
They also include the costs of investigating D's creditworthiness
and auditing his behavior over the life of the loan. Such moni-
toring costs will depend on the amount being lent, but, more im-
portantly, will also turn on the precise nature of C's relationship
with D. If C has never dealt with D before, it will need to spend
time acquainting itself with D's business affairs and credit his-
tory, the merits of any projects D plans to pursue with the bor-
rowed funds, other competing demands on D's resources, and
similar matters, before making any loan. These costs will be
lower if C has dealt with other persons in D's position in the past,
and lower still if C has dealt with D personally. Conversely, if C
51 See James Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk, 25 Rev Econ Stud
65, 85 (1958) (discussing the relationship between risk aversion and investors' willingness
to hold cash).
' Both of these determinants of C's cost of funds, interest and liquidity, in general will
depend on the amount of credit being extended, but to simplify the discussion I will speak
as if they are strictly proportional to the amount being lent.
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plans to deal with D again in the future, these costs can be amor-
tized over multiple occasions, while if this is an isolated transac-
tion, such costs will have to be recovered all at once.53 Similar
considerations apply to the costs of supervising the loan after it
has been made, keeping track of D's other assets as well as any
subsequent borrowing he may undertake, and maintaining the
value of any necessary collateral. I will denote the marginal cost
of such monitoring by the symbol m,,, where the subscript CD
emphasizes the relational aspects of these monitoring costs.
Third, even with optimal monitoring, some risk of debtor in-
solvency and default will still remain. The resultant loss to be ex-
pected depends on the probability of such a default, the amount of
funds that can be recovered afterwards, and the cost of collection.
All three of these quantities will depend on the amount of inves-
tigation and auditing that C has done, C's and D's individual
characteristics, and external factors out of both parties' control.
Furthermore, because C must accept this risk of insolvency and
default if it is to lend at all, C's subjective assessments of risk,
based on past experience with D and other debtors who appear in
C's eyes to be similar, is also relevant. Again, to highlight the re-
lational aspect of such considerations, I denote the marginal cost
of this risk, as perceived by C, as rco.
The total cost of credit under an unconditional loan from C to
D is thus ic + l + mcD + rco. In a competitive credit market-that
is, one in which C contends with many other potential creditors
for D's business-this total cost will also determine the interest
rate that D will have to pay for credit. A competitive market, of
course, does not ensure that the cost of credit is low. If D has lit-
tle experience with borrowing, or if he resembles other debtors
whose risks of default have been high in the past, or if the mar-
ket's subjective opinion of him is simply unfavorable, then the
competitive price of credit he faces will be high, because the ex-
pected monitoring and default costs of creditors dealing with him
will also be high. Furthermore, if he faces a noncompetitive credit
market, he will probably have to pay an additional mark-up
above and beyond marginal cost. Still, there is no particular rea-
son to think that the amount of any noncompetitive mark-up will
depend on the nonprice terms of the loan, or that lender market
power will result in an inefficient mix of auditing, investigation,
or other terms.54
See Scott, 86 Colura L Rev at 948 (cited in note 6) (emphasizing the importance of
fixed investigative and monitoring costs in the credit context, and arguing that such costs
explain why many individual debtor-creditor relationships tend to be long-term).
In general, while noncompetitive markets tend to produce inefficiently high prices
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Conversely, if D borrows directly and unconditionally from G,
his expected price of credit will equal the quantity ia + iG + mGD +
rG, -the sum of G's costs of interest, liquidity, monitoring, and
anticipated default risk when dealing with D on such a basis.
Whether D borrows from C or G, however, he must also add his
own personal transaction costs from borrowing to the market
price of credit. These include not just time, trouble, and the ex-
pense of dealing with legal papers, but the costs of investigating
and monitoring C and G in order to ensure that they themselves
do not act in an Opportunistic or negligent fashion. The size of
these various transaction costs will depend on the nature of D's
relationships with C and G and can be denoted as tnc and tDG, re-
spectively. Thus, when choosing between C and G as potential di-
rect creditors, D should prefer to borrow where his total costs are
least.
2. The cost of credit in a guaranty transaction.
The addition of a guarantor to the transaction unambigu-
ously reduces C's costs, for several reasons. First, because C can
anticipate that G will rationally wish to engage in some moni-
toring of D and will also wish to help ensure that D performs, C
can reduce its own monitoring efforts to a corresponding extent.
Second, even if G engages in no monitoring, her willingness to
underwrite D's debt credibly signals her subjective belief that D
is relatively likely to perform. To the extent that C has reason to
think G's risk assessments are accurate, this signal lowers its
own expected costs of monitoring and default. (Consider a mother
with two sons, one industrious and one irresponsible. Because the
mother knows that the former son is less likely to default than
the latter, the expected cost to her of giving him a guaranty is
lower. Other things being equal, accordingly, she is more likely to
guarantee the former's debt than the latter's.55)
(that is, prices in excess of marginal costs), they have no particular tendency toward inef-
ficient nonprice terms. On the contrary, a profit-seeking monopolist or oligopolist will or-
dinarily want to choose the nonprice terms that best suit the preferences of the marginal
consumer, for this maximizes the mark-up he or she can charge. For fuller explanations of
this point, see A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 Bell J Econ 417,
428 (1975); William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and
the New Antitrust Policy, 98 Harv L Rev 983, 990-98 (1985); Richard Craswell, Passing On
the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stan
L Rev 361, 373-76 (1991).
' Unless she feels that the industrious son, being better able to take care of himself, is
in less need of her largesse. But even so, the spendthrift's default risk to creditors makes a
guaranty a relatively costly way of helping him, so the use of the guaranty form still has
informational value to a creditor.
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Third, to the extent that D values his relationship with G,
cares about G's welfare, or anticipates that G will be better able
to collect than will C alone, D has incentives to take greater pre-
cautions against default. And, fourth and most obviously, should
D become insolvent, C will have a backup source of funds to pur-
sue. Except in the extreme case where D's and G's assets are es-
sentially the same (as with a parent and subsidiary corporation
that operate de facto as a single entity), the chance that both D
and G will become insolvent simultaneously is an order of magni-
tude less than the chance that either one will become insolvent
alone. 6
As a result, C would plainly prefer adding G to the transac-
tion if there were no costs associated with doing so. But of course
there is a cost-the risks and obligations that will be imposed on
G in her role as guarantor. To the extent that C is relieved from
the responsibility for monitoring, G is burdened with it. To the
extent that C can recover from G following D's default, G (and G's
other creditors) are at risk. Thus, many, though not all, of the
costs saved by C on a guaranteed loan are simply shifted to G.
We can analyze these costs of guaranties more formally.
First, we start with C's costs of interest, liquidity, monitoring,
and default risk: iC + 1C+ mcODIG + rCDI. (The notation CD I G denotes
C's cost of dealing with D given that G is also in the transaction;
note that these costs now include C's efforts to monitor G.) C's in-
terest and liquidity costs are unchanged by G's presence in the
transaction, but its combined monitoring and default risk costs
are lower for the four reasons explained above: mcDIG + rcDG < mcD
+ rC.
Next, we must consider the expected costs that G incurs in
her role as guarantor. First, while G need not pay interest costs
in order to provide a guaranty, she does incur some monitoring
costs. Second, she will also perceive some risk that D will default;
this perception depends on her own assessment of D's situation,
the investigative efforts she undertakes, and her ability to collect.
Both of these costs, furthermore, are influenced by C's involve-
ment in the transaction. The influence can cut one of two ways.
In the event that C's monitoring and investigation decreases D's
chances of default, G's costs of monitoring and collection will be
lowered; on the other hand, if C behaves opportunistically toward
This last factor explains why the wealth, financial strength, and credit reputation of
the guarantor matter to lenders in actual guaranty transactions. Additionally, to the ex-
tent that G turns out to be judgement-proof after the fact, her incentives to monitor the
debtor or accurately to signal his default risk are attenuated. On the importance of guar-
antor financial strength, see Section II.A.4.b.
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D or toward the collateral, G's costs may increase. (Indeed, for
this reason G may wish to engage in some investigation and
monitoring of C as well as of D.) Accordingly, G's monitoring and
default costs under a guaranty will depend on her relationship
with C, and are denoted here as mDc and rGD,c, respectively.
Third and finally, in the event of a default G not only must
pay out on her guaranty, she must also raise the necessary funds
to do so; this will force her to incur liquidity costs at that time.
Since such liquidity costs need not be paid up front, however,
they can be discounted by the probability of a default, rGDc. Thus,
G's total expected costs from a guaranty will equal mGDc + rDic (1
+ IG).
Let us now consider D's perspective on this transaction. In a
competitive credit market, D will have to pay the sum total of C's
costs and G's costs in order to obtain a guaranteed loan." On top
of that D must consider his own transaction costs of dealing with
C and G, both of which will depend on his prior relationship with
those parties. The total costs of dealing with both C and G to-
gether, moreover, are likely to be higher than the cost of dealing
with either one individually under a direct unconditional loan. I
denote these transaction costs as tDCIG + tDGc.
Without resorting to a great deal of tedious algebra, it should
be apparent that a loan made by C and guaranteed by G is
cheaper than a simple unguaranteed loan from C if, and only if,
the expected savings achieved by shifting some or all monitoring,
enforcement, and default risk costs from C to G outweigh the in-
creased transaction costs that arise from having to maintain
three relationships among the parties, instead of just one.59 In
short, guaranties are profitable when the guarantor holds a suffi-
ciently great comparative advantage in investigating, supervis-
ing, or collecting from the debtor in the event of default-in other
words, when the guarantor is the least-cost monitor. The creditor
and debtor engage the guarantor to do this monitoring and en-
forcement, either explicitly or implicitly, and the guarantor either
' For simplicity, I am assuming here that default, if it occurs, takes place at the end of
the loan period. Thus G gets to keep her funds throughout the life of the loan, and ac-
cordingly incurs no interest costs.
' This is so even if the guaranty is a gratuitous one, because G's ability and inclina-
tion to make gifts to D is presumably finite; any costs she incurs in making the guaranty
will reduce the fimds she has available for alternative or future gifts. Thus, D must count
the direct costs to G as an approximation of the opportunity costs to him resulting from
such a reduction.
" For aficionados of tedious algebra, the formal derivation is left as an exercise for the
reader.
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keeps the proceeds as her compensation or allows the debtor to
keep them as a gift.6"
This explanation of guaranties fits well with the stereotypi-
cal examples presented in Section I. Consider first the case of in-
trafamilial guaranties. Parents generally know their children
better than third-party lenders do. They are ordinarily familiar
with their children's past financial behavior and in most cases
have relatively more accurate information about their children's
day-to-day doings. The emotional aspects of ordinary family life
also help to reduce parents' costs of monitoring and collection.
Because of the awkwardness and guilt most adults feel when in
debt to their parents, and because of the utility they attach to
their parents' welfare, children will work harder to avoid de-
faulting when parents are potentially liable for filial debts. In the
event of default, furthermore, the parents are also better placed
than an outside creditor would be to collect from their children,
not only because they have better information about hidden as-
sets, but because the perceived moral obligation to repay a family
member for a bad loan is likely to survive bankruptcy where a
commercial obligation does not, and because ultimately parents
have the option of collecting by reducing future gifts and be-
quests.6
Similarly, controlling shareholders hold a comparative ad-
vantage in investigating, supervising, and collecting from the
corporations they oversee. As residual claimants, they enjoy the
marginal benefits and suffer the marginal costs of corporate ac-
tions, hold the balance of power for certain critical decisions, and
may even be entitled to dissolve the company entirely. All these
considerations make them good candidates to guarantee corpo-
rate debts. Parent companies have similar comparative advan-
tages in monitoring and collecting from their subsidiaries, and
sibling companies from their siblings. Subsidiary companies may
even have a comparative advantage in monitoring their corporate
parents, especially when there is common or overlapping man-
agement.
' In this regard, the issue can be refrained as one of the optimal level of vertical inte-
gration in the provision of credit services. For simple loans, the lender does all the risk as-
sessment, monitoring, and enforcement in-house, but sometimes it is cheaper to subcon-
tract some or all of these tasks to a specialist. Similarly, it might be cheaper to specialize
even further, and hire someone to monitor and insure against just one particular kind of
risk; the case of title insurance comes to mind here. Thanks to Victor Goldberg for sug-
gesting this example.
"1 On all these considerations, and for a general discussion of implicit financial con-
tracts between parents and children, see Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy, The Fam-
ily and the State, 31 J L & Econ 1, 1-8 (1988).
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The general practice of standby letters of credit can also be
understood in such terms. Commercial banks will have a com-
parative advantage in monitoring their existing credit customers,
as their prior relationships with such customers allow them to ob-
tain and evaluate relevant information at low cost. They also
have many more ways to influence such debtors' behavior after a
loan is made. For instance, they can call in, refuse to renew, or
exercise covenants on separate loans. In addition, they may have
established general "floating liens" on the debtor's property-that
is, mortgages or security interests that cover after-acquired prop-
erty or that provide that existing collateral will also serve to se-
cure future advances.2 Such cross-collateralization clauses im-
prove the bank's ability to collect on any advances it makes pur-
suant to a guaranty; they also give the bank substantial leverage
over the debtor by making it difficult for him to engage in subse-
quent borrowing without the bank's permission." Perhaps most
importantly, the prior relationship gives the bank the power to
ruin the customer's reputation with other lenders. Because an
unfavorable credit reference from a longstanding creditor carries
great weight in underwriting decisions, the bank can credibly
threaten to raise the customer's cost of borrowing for the foresee-
able future. Such a threat serves as a powerful incentive for D to
repay." For all these reasons, then, bank guaranties-cast in the
form of standby letters of credit-can substantially cut the ex-
pected costs of monitoring, default, and collection relative to un-
guaranteed loans.
Construction suretyships and payment bonds have a similar
underlying motive.65 A general contractor overseeing a construc-
tion project typically obtains significant advances from the proj-
6 Under UCC § 9-204, for instance, parties to a security agreement may provide that
any assets that D acquires before or after the agreement will serve as collateral for any
advances that the bank makes, including any payments that the bank makes pursuant to
a guaranty. With limited exceptions-id §§ 9-301(4), 9-307(3), and 9-312(3),(4),(7)--a se-
curity interest based on future advances will have the same priority over competing credi-
tors as the original security interest created by the agreement.
6 See Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86
Georgetown L J 1, 25-26 (1997) (arguing and presenting empirical evidence that the pri-
mary motivation for secured credit is to limit subsequent borrowing by the debtor).
" On the value of ruining a reputation as a contractual enforcement device, see, for
example, David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv L
Rev 373, 408-26 (1990); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Con-
tractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J Legal Stud 115, 138-43 (1992).
6 Thanks to Jim Bowers for suggesting this example and a good part of its analysis.
Similar considerations apply in other businesses besides construction. See, for example,
Mark C. Phillips, The Role of Completion Bonding Companies in Independent Productions,
12 Loyola LA Enter L J 97, 107-18 (1992) (describing the role of guarantors in the motion
picture industry).
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ect's overall sponsor and small-scale trade credit from a variety of
project participants: subcontractors, mechanics, and material-
men. Rather than having each of these participants undertake
the costs of investigating the contractor's credit and monitoring
his use of funds, however, it is far cheaper to hire a professional
surety company to do the job and bear the associated risk of de-
fault. This arrangement saves on duplicative monitoring efforts
and better allows the various trade creditors to focus on their re-
spective comparative advantages in plumbing, paving, and the
like, enabling them to submit lower bids. The surety, due to its
experience in the industry, is also likely to be more effective than
the sponsor at picking up the pieces of the project and seeing it to
conclusion should the contractor withdraw. Accordingly, using a
surety should lower the expected cost of project completion by
more than enough to cover the requiredpayment bond.
Finally, the example of joint and several liability among
apartment cotenants also fits our generic explanation. Apartment
roommates have an independent and ongoing incentive to inves-
tigate and supervise each others' reliability. They regularly ex-
tend each other petty credit in connection with shared household
expenses and, more importantly, share access to each others' per-
sonal property. They are also privy to each others' daily comings
and goings. With regard to claims such as damage to common ar-
eas, furthermore, the landlord is typically unable to determine
individual responsibility at reasonable cost. It makes sense,
therefore, for landlords to hire roommates to monitor each other
by providing for joint and several liability rather than contracting
for several liability alone-at least up to the liquidated amount of
a security deposit.
One clarification to the analysis is perhaps in order. In many
cases, the guarantor has a comparative advantage in monitoring
or collection because she is in significant part promising to moni-
tor or collect from herself. Much default risk, after all, results
from debtors' opportunistic collusion with other parties. In the
corporate and familial settings especially, guaranties are com-
monly used to guard against just such misbehavior. For instance,
because of limited liability, creditors of corporate debtors need to
worry not only about whether the underlying project being fi-
nanced is sound; they also must worry whether the proceeds of
the loan will remain within the corporation or be funneled to a
controlling owner, related entity, or other insider. Minimum capi-
tal requirements, the corporate law duties of care and loyalty,
fraudulent conveyance law, and the doctrine of piercing the cor-
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porate veil all substantially help to police such misbehavior.66 In
addition, however, many lenders also insist on receiving guaran-
ties from those actors deemed most subject to temptation; for ex-
ample, controlling shareholders. Similarly, a lender contemplat-
ing a loan to an individual borrower will often insist on receiving
a guaranty from the borrower's spouse, especially if the spouse
holds a shared interest in property pledged as collateral or oth-
erwise holds the power to disrupt attempts at collection.
3. Why does the guarantor guarantee rather than
simply lend?
The foregoing account of guaranties is straightforward and
intuitive, but it is not the complete story. If guarantors have a
comparative advantage with investigation, supervision, and col-
lection, why don't they just make loans themselves, thus saving
the extra transaction costs of a three-corner relationship? Or, to
choose a concrete example, why do commercial banks issue
standby letters of credit to their longstanding customers instead
of just extending additional advances under an existing line of
credit? The answer cannot be that they wish to limit their expo-
sure, because the terms of the standby credit make them liable
for its face value in the event of default. Banks' desire to exploit
loopholes in federal lending regulations may have partly ex-
plained their use of standby credits in the early 1980s, but today
those loopholes have largely (though not entirely) been closed. Is
there, then, an efficiency explanation?
There is, and it is evident when we recognize that monitor-
ing, investigation, and collection are only part of the cost of
credit. Recall that G's credit costs'as a direct lender also include
her implicit interest rate i, and her liquidity cost 1G. As a guaran-
tor, however, G avoids paying for implicit interest during the pe-
riod the loan is outstanding, and she only need pay for liquidity
in the event of a default. Interest and liquidity costs do not dis-
appear if G acts as guarantor, of course; they are simply trans-
ferred to the primary creditor C. But if C's cost of liquid funds is
" Guaranties by subsidiaries of their parent companies pose some special legal prob-
lems because the owners of the parent have diluted incentives to ensure that the subsidi-
ary receives fair value for guaranteeing the parent's obligations. In the event that the sub-
sidiary becomes insolvent, its creditors are likely to attack the guaranty as a fraudulent
conveyance or an impairment of required capital. On the problems raised by such "up-
stream" guaranties, see William H. Coquillette, Guaranty of and Security for the Debt of a
Parent Corporation by a Subsidiary Corporation, 30 Case W Reserve L Rev 433, 438-60
(1980).
See text accompanying notes 96-97.
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sufficiently lower than G's, it can more than make up for the ex-
tra information and transaction costs incurred by a three-corner
arrangement.
The point is easily demonstrated with a numerical example.
Consider the situation of a debtor D who applies for a $10,000
loan from a potential creditor C, to be repaid after one year. Sup-
pose for purposes of the example that the risk-free interest rate is
4 percent, reflecting the going rate of return on one-year Treasury
bills, and that C has ready access to liquid assets at no additional
cost beyond this risk-free rate.68 Suppose also that if C lends to D,
it will incur monitoring costs equal to 1 percent of the face value
of the loan, and that even after such monitoring, there will re-
main a 15 percent chance of default. In this case, C will insist on
charging a risk-adjusted interest rate of 20 percent (= 4 percent +
1 percent + 15 percent) if it makes the loan. Depending on the
project D is planning to finance, such a high cost of funds may
prevent the transaction from going forward; even if D is willing
and able to pay C's required rate of return, it may exceed the
price ceiling established by local usury laws.69
Alternatively, suppose that if D borrows from G instead of
from C, G's superior ability to monitor and collect from D will cut
the expected cost of default to 10 percent. Adding this default risk
to the risk-free interest rate of 4 percent and monitoring costs of 1
percent makes G's cost of liquid credit 15 percent.70 But G holds
her assets in a relatively illiquid form, and thus bears a further
10 percent cost in making them available for use by D. This
raises G's required interest rate to 25 percent, making her a less
desirable lender, both from D's private viewpoint and from the
social viewpoint of economic efficiency.
If C makes the loan and G guarantees it, however, C's access
to liquid funds will keep the direct cost of the loan down to 4 per-
cent, and G's superior monitoring ability will keep the cost of de-
For simplicity, we might imagine that C finances the loan to D by reducing its pur-
chases of government bonds by $10,000. More generally, as the preceding discussion
makes plain, all market interest rates can be decomposed into components attributable to
pure time value, liquidity, risk, and transaction costs. The precise assumption necessary
here is that C has no additional cost of liquidity above and beyond whatever liquidity
component is implicit in the risk-free market rate.
See, for example, Ark Const, Art 19, § 13 (maximum lawful interest rate is equal to
5 percent above the Federal Reserve discount rate at the time of the loan); Conn Gen Stat
Ann § 37-4 (West 1996) (maximum rate of 12 percent); Fla Stat Ann I § 687.03 (West
1990) (maximum rate of 18 percent on loans less than $500,000).
70 To keep the calculations simple, the example assumes that G's comparative advan-
tage in monitoring is reflected only in a reduced probability of default. The argument
would be analogous, though more complex, in the case where her out-of-pocket costs of
monitoring are also lower than C's.
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fault down to 10 percent. Of course, G will have to provide liquid
funds in the event of a default, but that event can be discounted
by its low probability. Thus while G's liquidity costs under a di-
rect loan are 10 percent, her expected liquidity costs under a
guaranty are equal to 10 percent of 10 percent, or 1 percent.
Summing up, interest costs of 4 percent plus monitoring costs of 1
percent plus default costs of 10 percent plus liquidity costs of 1
percent equals 16 percent. Of course, there are additional costs of
structuring the transaction as a guaranty, including the costs of
duplicative monitoring by C and G. If we denote these additional
transaction costs as t, then the total cost of credit under a guar-
anty becomes 16 percent + t. If t is low enough-specifically, if t is
less than 4 percent-then a guaranty will be cheaper and more
efficient than a direct loan from either C or G.
A guaranty, in short, is a credit transaction in which one
party-the guarantor-specializes in information and monitoring,
and another-the creditor-specializes in obtaining loanable
funds. All of the guaranty arrangements described above accord
with this basic principle. Let us examine a few of them as illus-
trations.
Consider first our example of the standby letter of credit. At
any given moment, the marginal cost of interest and liquidity
varies among large commercial banks. Such banks have different
mixtures of long-term and short-term loans in their asset portfo-
lios, and different risk exposures based on the specific commercial
activities of their customers and on the particular investment
products they have decided to back. Therefore, it can make sense
for a bank with relatively heavy exposure in the area of commer-
cial real estate, for instance, to decide that its marginal cost of li-
quidity is too high to justify a new loan to a longstanding client at
market rates. If the client can obtain liquid funds elsewhere,
however, the bank can trade on its informational investment in
him by issuing a standby letter of credit in his favor. Conversely,
another bank with temporarily superior access to a pool of liquid
funds due, for instance, to a special relationship with an institu-
tional depositor, may find it worthwhile to make a loan to an un-
tried applicant if that applicant's current lender is willing to
stand behind him. The standby letter of credit thus allows the
debtor to benefit from the low monitoring cost that comes from
establishing a long-term financing relationship while still re-
taining the option of shopping around for the best pure price on
liquid funds.7'
" In addition, the distinctive risk profile of a guaranteed loan may give it positive di-
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Similarly, consider how our basic explanation operates in the
context of a recourse sale or assignment of accounts receivable.
Under this arrangement, a retailer sells receivables to an account
financer or factor, promising to repay the factor for any accounts
that turn out to be uncollectible.72 In the framework of our model,
the factor takes the role of the creditor, the retailer takes the role
of guarantor, and the consumers take the role of debtor. Asking
why the guarantor doesn't just lend in this context is equivalent
to asking why the retailer doesn't just keep her accounts instead
of factoring them. The answer, obvious to anyone familiar with
the business of factoring, is that the retailer wants the money
now instead of later. She wants liquid funds with which to pay
current expenses and restock inventory, and this is her cheapest
means of borrowing to obtain them. The factor, which has supe-
rior access to loanable funds, provides her with those assets in
exchange for the discount it gets on the accounts. But because the
retailer is familiar with her own customer base, and because the
value of the accounts depends on the future repair or warranty
services she provides to these customers, she thus appropriately
bears the risk of consumer nonpayment.73
The typical circumstances surrounding the standard intra-
familial guaranty also comport with our theory. A parent may be
highly confident in her child's ability to repay a loan and have
quite effective means at her disposal to ensure that he actually
does repay. As a result, she is willing to guarantee the loan while
receiving relatively little in exchange; indeed, the expected cost to
her may be low enough to justify making her guaranty a gift. But
because the family assets are tied up in the house and in'the par-
ents' retirement savings accounts, making the same loan out of
pocket would be quite expensive. If the child should default, of
versification value when combined with the rest of the issuer's lending portfolio. See, for
example, M. Kabir Hassan, An Empirical Analysis of Bank Standby Letters of Credit Risk,
2 Rev Fin Econ 31, 38-42 (1992) (presenting evidence of such value for the largest U.S.
banks and holding companies). But see Elijah Brewer, III and G.D. Koppenhaver, The Im-
pact of Standby Letters of Credit on Bank Risk: A Note, 16 J Bank & Fin 1037, 1040-44
(1992) (presenting empirical evidence that the overall risk of issuing standby letters of
credit is similar to the risk of balance sheet lending).
Or alternatively, the factor could make a secured loan to the retailer with the ac-
counts serving as collateral. With minor exceptions, these two arrangements are legally
and functionally equivalent. See UCC § 9-102(1)(b) & comment 2.
Conversely, if she were not the cheaper monitor, the sale would be on a nonrecourse
basis, not a recourse one. The factor would then act as a direct lender, bearing the risk of
default as well as providing liquid funds. See Janet Kiholm Smith and Chrisjahn
Schnucker, An empirical examination of organizational structure: The economics of the fac-
toring decision, 1 J Corp Fin 119, 126-35 (1994) (presenting evidence that factors are more
likely to be used to finance trade credit on what is effectively a nonrecourse basis, other
things being equal, when the seller's information and monitoring costs are high).
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course, the IRAs would have to be cashed in and the house mort-
gaged; but the chance of this happening is low-low enough to be
outweighed by the benefits conferred on the child.
Our model is also broad enough to encompass at least one
plausible nonpecuniary explanation for guaranties within the
family. It has often been claimed that arms-length economic
transactions between friends and family members weaken the
bonds of friendship and clan loyalty. For instance, Steven Kelman
has suggested that market interactions can lead to a "feeling-
falloff" effect that leads people to devalue their personal relation-
ships with those with whom they deal. 4 Some feminist critics of
law and economics, notably Frances Olsen and Margaret Jane
Radin, have argued that economic analysis (and economic analy-
sis of family law in particular) tends to commodify family rela-
tions, undermining the love and altruism that are essential to the
maintenance of household cooperation and the healthy upbring-
ing of children.75 If such claims are true, and if a direct debtor-
creditor relationship is somehow more destructive of familial
feeling than are the indirect and contingent obligations that arise
from a guaranty, then guaranties will conserve on such psychic
and emotional costs in the same way they conserve on liquidity
costs. Given the possibility of default, there is always a chance
that any guaranty will turn into an unconditional debt, with re-
sulting cost to both fisc and fabric of the family unit. But these
costs can be discounted substantially if the probability of incur-
ring them is low.
4. Why doesn't the guarantor simply act as
an intermediary?
We are not quite done with the analysis. The guarantor's
comparative advantage in monitoring, risk assessment, and col-
lection explains why she should bear the residual risk of the
debtor's default; the creditor's comparative advantage in liquidity
explains why it should obtain the funds. But neither explanation
tells us why the relationship should take the form of a guaranty,
for these same advantages could be achieved through pure inter-
mediation or on-lending. Specifically, C could obtain funds and
lend them to G, who could then turn around and lend to D. 6 Un-
" Steven Kelman, What Price Incentives: Economists and the Environment 57-69
(Auburn House 1981).
" Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Re-
form, 96 Harv L Rev 1497, 1560-78 (1983); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,
100 Harv L Rev 1849, 1921-36 (1987).
7 Or, alternatively, we could reverse the timing: G could first lend to D and then re-
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der such an arrangement, G would bear the costs of monitoring D
and dealing with any default on his part, since she would remain
liable to C whether or not D managed to repay. C would bear the
costs of liquidity, since it would be the one who obtains the funds.
There would, moreover, be only two relationships to manage in-
stead of three. What, then are the advantages of guaranties as
opposed to intermediation? Or to put the question differently,
what are the advantages of giving C a direct right of recovery
against D as well as against G?
It turns out that there are two answers to this question,
which I take up in sequence. First, G's comparative advantage in
supervising D may be incomplete, so that it pays for G to under-
take some aspects of monitoring, risk assessment, or collection
and for C to undertake others. Second, there is always a chance
that G herself may default on her obligations to C. If she does,
giving C a direct right against D allows C to avoid sharing the
proceeds of D's loan with G's other creditors, in much the same
way that a security interest confers priority over rival creditors.
a) Specialization in different types of monitoring or enforce-
ment. Recall that monitoring, as we have used the term, incorpo-
rates a wide variety of distinct business functions: underwriting,
credit investigation, drafting and executing contracts, auditing,
and the like. Similarly, collection may involve pursuing legal or
nonlegal sanctions against the debtor, locating and gathering his
assets, salvaging and reselling them, and, ultimately, bearing the
risk that the proceeds will be inadequate to cover the debt.
It is quite possible for G to have a comparative advantage in
some of these tasks and C to have a comparative advantage in
others. If so, it is efficient to have C and G specialize in different
types of monitoring or enforcement. Consider, for example, a loan
made for the purposes of financing a startup enterprise. The bor-
rower's family members may be better able to assess his overall
honesty and industriousness, keep track of his personal assets,
and collect from him in the event of a business failure. On the
other hand, they may know relatively little about the specific line
of business he is contemplating or may lack experience in evalu-
ating whether such startup projects have what it takes to suc-
ceed. For these reasons, they may not wish to incur the risk of fi-
nancing the project out of their own funds. Once a commercial
lender with background in the relevant industry has evaluated
and underwritten the project, however, the residual risk to the
plenish her supply of liquid funds by borrowing from C. The point is the same: C could be
the ultimate supplier of funds without having to deal directly with D.
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family members from guaranteeing the borrower's debt is sub-
stantially lowered.
One way to achieve such specialization, of course, is through
direct subcontracting of the relevant activities--one party could
make the loan and hire another party to conduct underwriting or
collection. Indeed, such subcontracts are not uncommon, as the
existence of the credit reporting industry illustrates. But the very
fact that one party has a comparative advantage in some aspect
of monitoring or enforcement may make it difficult for the other
interested parties to tell whether he or she is carrying out such
tasks effectively. For that reason, monitors and enforcers are
typically allocated some portion of the risk of default; for in-
stance, a collection agency hired to hunt down delinquent ac-
counts might be paid a commission based on the amounts it actu-
ally manages to extract from recalcitrant debtors. Thus, to make
use of C's and G's comparative advantages, it is necessary to pro-
vide both with incentives to perform their assigned tasks.
A guaranty promotes such dual incentives better than pure
intermediation. Under intermediation, the risk of D's default is
borne almost entirely by G and hardly at all by C. C has no direct
connection with D and no specific obligation to monitor him; in-
deed, so long as G retains other assets sufficient to repay her
loan, C is fully protected against loss. Under a guaranty contract,
in contrast, both G and C have good incentives to engage in moni-
toring. G's incentives to monitor D are obvious-absent some ex-
cuse or defense, she will be liable for his default. C's incentives,
however, arise from the fact that if it fails to act reasonably or to
live up to its other contractual obligations, G will acquire just
such an excuse or defense, for under the law of suretyship and
guaranty, C owes special duties toward G-duties it does not owe
to other ordinary creditors or debtors. These are the so-called
"suretyship defenses." Failing to perform duties owed the debtor,
failing to maintain rights against the debtor or against any col-
lateral, granting the debtor unreasonable extensions or modifica-
tions-all operate in the guaranty context to release the guaran-
tor from her obligation. As Section 37 of the Third Restatement
provides: "If the obligee acts to increase the secondary obligor's
risk of loss by increasing its potential cost of performance or de-
creasing its potential ability to cause the principal obligor to bear
the cost of performance, the secondary obligor is discharged."
7
' Restatement 3d § 37 (cited in note 5). See also the discussion accompanying notes
36-37.
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The law of suretyship, accordingly, provides both C and G
with incentives to engage in monitoring, in the same way that
negligence law provides dual incentives to take precautions
against accidents and contract law provides dual incentives for
parties to mitigate damages. Under each of these regimes, one
party-the guarantor in surety, the victim in tort, the promisor in
contract-is presumptively liable for a loss, and so has optimal
incentives to take care to prevent it. The presumption is reversed,
however, if the other party breaches a legal duty of care. The
threat of that reversal gives that other party-the primary credi-
tor C, the potential tortfeasor, the contract promisee-strong in-
centives to take care. This result has been called "double respon-
sibility on the margin.""8
Of course, it is not always efficient for law or contract to try
to give both parties incentives to take care. If there is relatively
little that one side can do to influence the underlying risk, or if
the tribunal charged with enforcing the relevant duty of care is
not good at determining whether it has really been breached,
then the attempt to provide dual incentives may be more costly
than it is worth. This is why, for instance, strict liability in tort is
sometimes more efficient than a negligence rule. 9 Similarly, if
one of the parties already has good incentives to take care based
on extralegal considerations such as reputation, it may be better
for that party to disclaim liability for negligence or similar
breaches of duty, reserving legal sanctions for the purpose of mo-
tivating the party not subject to such extralegal incentives. ° For
all these reasons, then, it may be desirable in some cases to cast a
' Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
Cal L Rev 1, 28 (1985).
See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J Legal Stud 1, 10-22
(1980) (formal comparison of precaution incentives under competing rules); Guido
Calabresi and Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L J
1055, 1074-84 (1972) (informal comparison of incentives). Similar considerations of rela-
tive ability to reduce risk and institutional capacity also determine which party should be
presumptively responsible for a loss under a negligence-type rule and which party's
breach of duty should operate to reverse that initial presumption. For instance, if courts
are extremely good at detecting and punishing unreasonable behavior on the part of injur-
ers, negligence is the most efficient rule of tort liability. Conversely, if courts are better
able to evaluate victims' behavior, it is better to have a rule of strict liability with a de-
fense of contributory negligence. Calabresi and Hirschoff, 81 Yale L J at 1074-84. In the
guaranty context, analogous factors determine which party-C or G-should take the role
of creditor and which party should take the role of guarantor.
' See, for example, Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Con-
tractual Arrangements, 70 Am Econ Assn Papers & Proceedings 356, 358-60 (1980) (de-
fending the unrestricted right of franchisors to terminate franchise contracts without
proof of cause, on grounds that their tendencies toward opportunism are restrained by
reputation while franchisees' are not).
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credit transaction in the form of an intermediation rather than as
a guaranty. Such factors can also help explain why it might be ef-
ficient for guarantors to waive their rights to assert the standard
suretyship defenses; indeed, such explicit waivers are routine in
many important commercial settings.8
b) Risk of G's insolvency or recalcitrance. A second and
equally important reason why guaranties may be preferable to
intermediation is that G herself may fall into default and prove
uncollectable s2 In this event, a guaranty contract gives C an al-
ternate means of expedited collection, as well as partial priority
over G's other creditors. Indeed, from a functional perspective, a
guaranty is analogous to a secured loan by C to G, with D's
promise to pay operating as the collateral.
Specifically, in the event that G defaults or becomes insol-
vent, guaranties and intermediation have different consequences.
Under intermediation, C will have no contract or property claim
allowing it to reach any of G's assets in particular. In order to
collect directly from D, it would first have to win a lawsuit
against G for breach of contract and then obtain and enforce a
judgment lien against G's interest in D's loan. Such remedies can
be costly; more importantly, in the time it takes under state col-
lection law to pursue them, any value remaining in the loan may
have dissipated. Furthermore, if G actually turns out to be insol-
vent, C will be forced to participate in bankruptcy proceedings
and will have to share any proceeds arising from D's debt (and
from G's other remaining assets) with all of G's other creditors on
a pro rata basis.8"
Under a guaranty, in contrast, C gets an expedited collection
procedure and an effective priority in D's debt over G's other
creditors, through its option to obtain repayment directly from
D. 4 Of course, giving such an option to C is not costless; to the ex-
"1 See note 46 and accompanying text.
"This risk is nontrivial even when dealing with large commercial guarantors and is-
suers of standby letters of credit, as the 1982 failure of Penn Square Bank illustrated. See
Michael A. Goldberg and Peter R. Lloyd-Davies, Standby Letters of Credit: Are Banks
Overextending Themselves?, 16 J Bank Research 28, 30-32 (1985) (noting the problems
faced by many beneficiaries of Penn Square Bank standby letters of credit after the bank's
collapse).
' See 11 USC § 726(b) (1994) (specifying pro rata distribution of property in Chapter 7
liquidations); id § 1123(a)(4) (requiring equal treatment of each claim of a particular
class).
Federal bankruptcy law, however, may limit both of these advantages. See, for ex-
ample, Trimec, Inc v Zale Corp, 150 Bankr 685, 687 (N D Ill 1993) (applying automatic
stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC § 362 (1988), to defer a creditor's attempt
to collect from a nonbankrupt debtor when the debtor shared substantial business identity
with a bankrupt guarantor).
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tent that C is able to satisfy itself out of the proceeds of D's debt
to G, there will be fewer assets left for G's other creditors.
Whether it is efficient to give C a priority in these proceeds, how-
ever, depends on whether that priority is more valuable in C's
hands than in the hands of G's other creditors-or equivalently,
whether C gains more from the priority than the other creditors
lose.
But a well-established account of how one should allocate
priority among creditors in the event of insolvency already exists;
it can be found in the economic literature on secured credit. This
account begins with the observation that secured credit has
higher direct transaction costs than unsecured credit: it is neces-
sary to write a special contract, file a public notice, restrict the
use of collateral, and so on. Security is only worthwhile, on this
account, if its other advantages justify these costs. This can be
the case only if the secured lender places a higher value on a spe-
cific interest in the collateral than do the debtor's other creditors;
otherwise the cost the debtor will pay when seeking other fi-
nancing after having encumbered his assets will more than out-
weigh the benefits he receives in exchange for granting a security
interest.85 The secured lender's higher value in specific collateral
can arise from various factors: from superior information re-
garding its market or use-value, from a comparative advantage in
salvage, from superior ability to monitor the collateral's where-
abouts or to prevent it from being diverted to other uses-or from
a relatively inferior ability to monitor, evaluate, or make use of
the debtor's other assets. If any of these factors are present, value
is created when the secured lender takes priority in the collater-
alized asset, leaving other, unsecured creditors to take their com-
pensation through other property or through an increased price
or risk premium. 86
The advantages and disadvantages of guaranties, when
viewed as devices for gaining leverage and priority in the event of
default, are precisely analogous. Guaranties have higher direct
transaction costs than intermediation. While no public notice is
required to create a guaranty, one does need to write a special
See Schwartz, 18 J Legal Stud at 210-14 (cited in note 6).
See generally id at 216-18; Scott, 86 Colum L Rev at 925-33 (cited in note 6); Trian-
tis, 21 J Legal Stud at 249-55 (cited in note 6); Buckley, 72 Va L Rev at 1439-51 (cited in
note 7). In addition, as Ronald Mann has argued, secured credit may also have the advan-
tage of providing a credible commitment against excessive future borrowing by hindering
the flexibility of the debtor's business. See Mann, 86 Georgetown L J at 25-26 (cited in
note 63); Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 Harv L Rev 625,
649-58 (1997) (arguing that this credible commitment theory provides the best explana-
tion of the empirical evidence relating to the use of security).
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contract, keep track of the rights and duties of three parties, and
restrict the manner in which the guarantor and creditor deal with
the debtor.
Accordingly, guaranties are worthwhile compared to inter-
mediation only if C places a sufficiently higher value on having a
direct claim against D than do G's other creditors; otherwise the
costs that G incurs in her dealings with these other creditors will
outweigh any benefits she gets when giving or selling the guar-
anty. This condition will be satisfied if C has superior information
regarding the value of D's obligation to G, if C has superior abil-
ity to supervise D's behavior, or if C has superior ability to collect
from D-in short, if C has a sufficient comparative advantage
over G's other creditors in monitoring or enforcing against D.
This condition seems to be satisfied in most cases in which
guaranties are used. Because C generally has had some prior
dealings with D, has investigated D, enjoys some special leverage
over D, or expects to do any of these things in the future, it makes
sense for C to look directly to D for repayment or at least to have
the option to do so. If C instead lends to G on an unsecured basis,
it loses all the advantages that flow from its relationship with D.
As an illustration, consider the position of an automobile dealer
who lends to a college student on a loan cosigned by the student's
parent, whose only other liability is a mortgage on the family
house. The auto dealer will place a much higher value on the
right to proceed against the student than will the parent's mort-
gage lender, because the latter does not know anything about the
student and may not even be accustomed to dealing with cars.
Accordingly, the parent will minimize her cost of credit by giving
the auto dealer priority over the mortgage lender in whatever
value may lie in the student's promise to pay.
Similarly, consider the factoring of consumer accounts. As we
saw in the previous subsection, factoring with recourse corre-
sponds to a guaranty in which the consumers take the role of D,
the account factor takes the role of C, and the retailer takes the
role of G. This arrangement is more efficient than unguaranteed
lending because the factor has better access to liquid funds and
the retailer has better control over whether the consumers pay
their accounts. Factoring is not the only way for the factor to pro-
vide liquidity and the retailer to provide monitoring and enforce-
ment; the same result could be achieved through pure interme-
diation, with the factor making a general unsecured loan to the
retailer and the retailer selling on credit to her consumers. But
this latter arrangment makes little sense when dealing with a
professional factor, for it sacrifices the value of the factor's exper-
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tise relative to other commercial lenders. The reason that a re-
tailer can get more from a factor for her accounts than she can
from unsecured creditors is that the factor specializes in lending
against accounts and has experience in assessing and monitoring
their value. Other lenders such as finance companies and general
trade creditors, who know relatively little about accounts or their
collection, will only lend against them at an extreme discount.
Accordingly, it is most efficient to give the factor a direct right of
action against the accounts (and perhaps a security interest in
them as well) rather than to ask them to share with these other
lenders.
A third example is provided by the typical apartment sub-
lease, where the landlord has little or no role in choosing the sub-
tenant. In this situation, the parties could arrange to have the
subtenant primarily liable to the landlord for the rent and the
tenant secondarily liable-a guaranty arrangement. Or they
could have the subtenant liable only to the tenant, who would in
turn be unconditionally liable to the landlord-a form of interme-
diation. Most likely, however, the parties as a group will be better
off having the landlord look for payment from both the original
tenant and her subtenant. Beyond the amount of the security de-
posit, it may be too costly or impossible to collect from a tenant
who has moved to another location and taken her personal pos-
sessions with her. The value of any payments made by the sub-
tenant, conversely, will likely depend on how well the landlord
keeps up its corresponding obligations under the primary lease.
Similarly, through its management of the building and adjoining
realty, the landlord has superior information regarding the sub-
tenant's activities and whereabouts and so has some control over
any misbehavior. This gives the landlord reason to value the sub-
tenant's payments more than the subtenant's other creditors
would.
Guaranties are more efficient than pure intermediation, in
short, when C has some special interest or comparative advan-
tage in monitoring D--either relative to G or to G's other credi-
tors. The former comparison will be relevant in the event that G
is solvent, and the latter comparison will be relevant in the event
that she is not. Intermediation, in contrast, makes sense when
the ultimate creditor has no comparative advantage in monitor-
ing or collecting from the ultimate borrower. As a stereotypical
example, consider commercial banking as it has traditionally
been practiced: the bank obtains liquid funds from various indi-
vidual depositors and lends them out to various business and
consumer borrowers. Here the plainly efficient arrangement is for
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the bank to act as a pure intermediary. Since the depositors are
in no position to evaluate or supervise the bank's lending deci-
sions, there is no reason for them to take priority in or to have a
direct claim against any particular loan or group of loans. The
transaction costs of doing so-including, most importantly, the
substantial inconvenience to the depositors of having to concern
themselves with the bank's lending portfolio, and the corre-
sponding inconvenience to borrowers of having to deal with in-
quiries from a multitude of small, scattered creditors-would
simply be wasted. 7
B. Nonefficiency Reasons for Guaranties
The discussion thus far has focused almost exclusively on
considerations of economic efficiency. As the introduction to this
Section observed, however, the fact that an exchange yields prof-
its for its participants does not ensure that it is efficient from the
social viewpoint, or vice versa. Indeed, many real-world guaran-
ties are motivated in whole or in part by rent seeking-that is, by
the prospect of evading regulatory constraints or enjoying dis-
tributional gains at the expense of nonparties to the transaction.
To complete the analysis, accordingly, and to determine whether
any particular guaranty transaction is actually efficient, we also
need to survey the ways in which guaranties can impose exter-
nalities, avoid private or public regulation, and extract distribu-
tional rents.
In the context of commercial credit, the other creditors of D
and G are obvious targets for rent extraction. If these creditors
are fully aware of the relationship among C, D, and G, and if the
market for credit is competitive, they can fully protect themselves
by adjusting the terms of their contracts with D and G to com-
pensate for any resultant changes in risk. Many outside creditors,
however, will be unaware of the details of the participants' ar-
rangements (as in the case of incidental trade creditors whose
loans are too small to make keeping track of D's and G's doings
worthwhile), unable to alter the terms of their loans in response
(as is the case with tort claimants and other involuntary credi-
tors), or both (as with employees not represented in collective
bargaining arrangements who are creditors to the extent of un-
paid wages and benefits). Accordingly, these third parties may
8' For a formal economic model reaching similar conclusions, but focusing on the
bank's ability to diversify risk as an explanation of its incentives to monitor effectively, see
Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 Rev Econ
Stud 393, 398-409 (1984).
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suffer negative externalities if the parties to the principal credit
transaction are allowed full freedom of contract."
It is difficult, however, to know in which direction these po-
tential externalities cut in the guaranty context. Because (in con-
trast with secured credit and mortgages) there is no centralized
system of notice or recording for guaranties, and because it is dif-
ficult for parties not in contact with D to gauge his potential for
default, G's other creditors may inadequately adjust for the in-
creased risk the guaranty poses for their claims. This would sug-
gest an incentive for the issuance of too many guaranties. On the
other hand, because parties not in contact with G may be un-
aware of or unable to appreciate the value of her guaranty, D's
and C's other creditors are likely to adjust inadequately for the
decrease in risk the guaranty provides them. This countervailing
factor would imply that too few guaranties are being written.
Conversely, guaranties can impose externalities on debtors
with whom D is in competition for funds. To the extent that a
guaranty from G allows D to improve his credit prospects by sig-
naling his reliability, part of this informational gain comes at the
expense of the general pool of credit applicants. After sending this
signal, D appears more reliable than he otherwise would, but
others in his risk pool will, as a direct consequence, appear less
reliable than they otherwise would. These other applicants, ac-
cordingly, will receive less credit on less favorable terms than be-
fore. Additionally, to the extent that competing applicants go to
the expense and trouble of getting a guaranty of their own, they
will find that the more guaranties are provided, the more their
signaling value is diluted. In this latter instance, the result may
be a rat race in which all parties are worse off than if none had
tried to signal in the first place. 9
"This argument should be familiar to followers of the scholarly literature on mort-
gages and personal property security interests, where it has commonly been offered as a
reason to limit the availability of and the priorities arising from secured credit. See, for
example, Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 Va L Rev 1887, 1947-63
(1994); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Se-
cured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 Yale L J 857, 895-903 (1996); Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Death of Liability, 106 Yale L J 1, 61-63 (1996). It should be noted, however, that small
voluntary creditors stand on a somewhat different footing in this regard than do involun-
tary creditors. While the former may not know specifically whether their debtors have re-
ceived or given guaranties, they do know that such guaranties are regularly made, and, if
they are sophisticated, they will alter their lending terms to reflect the discounted prob-
ability of being exploited (or alternately, benefited) by a guaranty. But since only some
debts are guaranteed, this adjustment, while accurate on average, will either be excessive
(if no guaranty is given) or inadequate (if a guaranty is in fact given) in the actual case.
Accordingly, guaranties still impose externalities on such creditors, even if they are not
distributionally disadvantaged in the manner of involuntary creditors.
"The classic formulation of this argument can be found in Michael Spence, Job Mar-
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Various commonly articulated rationales for guaranties can
be understood in terms of such externalities. For instance, it is of-
ten claimed that guaranties are preferred for accounting rea-
sons-that they look better on one or more of the parties' balance
sheets than would an outright unguaranteed loan. 0 One reason
that guaranties might look better, of course, is that they are in
fact more efficient for some of the reasons discussed earlier in
this Section; but those who make this claim typically mean that
the apparent improvement on paper exceeds the real economic
value of the transaction. If they are correct in this regard, it can
only be because the accounting and auditing specialists, who su-
pervise the principal parties for the benefit of third-party credi-
tors and investors, use imperfect categories to assess and com-
municate the parties' financial health. If the combined financial
statements of the principals appear spuriously stronger when
they use guaranties rather than loans, then third-party creditors
and investors will mistakenly be induced to deal with them on
more favorable terms than they otherwise would. Similarly, the
financial statements of competing actors who do not use guaran-
ties will look weaker in comparison, and such actors will face
greater borrowing costs as a result. To the extent that the ac-
counting advantages of guaranties exceed their real economic ad-
vantages, the benefit to the principals comes at these third par-
ties' expense."
ket Signaling, 87 Q J Econ 355, 358-61 (1973) (analyzing equilibria in labor markets
where employees send costly signals of their quality). See also George Akerlof, The Eco-
nomics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales, 90 Q J Econ 599 (1976) (dis-
cussing how signals can upset market equilibria). The proper policy response to such ex-
ternalities, if they exist, is not obvious. Depending on the particular circumstances, it may
be possible to improve social welfare either by subsidizing information acquisition or by
taxing it. See, for example, Severin Borenstein, The Economics of Costly Risk Sorting in
Competitive Insurance Markets, 9 Intl Rev L & Econ 25, 32-33 (1989) (demonstrating am-
biguity of optimal policy response in insurance setting).
'o For instance, under current rules of the Financial Accounting Standards Board
("FASB"), banks and other businesses need only disclose standby letters of credit in a
footnote to the balance sheet; they do not have to treat the letters explicitly as a contin-
gent liability. See, for example, Medhat Helmi and Nitham Hindi, Raining on Banking's
Parade: New Rules Promote Fuller Accounting of Liabilities, 40 Natl Pub Acct 17, 18 (Jan
1995) (arguing that FASB rules should be amended to treat standbys as contingent liabili-
ties, and offering empirical evidence to demonstrate that sufficient data exists to estimate
the value of such contingencies). Attempts to correct for the imperfections of such ac-
counting practices are ongoing. For example, under the risk-based capital standards, es-
tablished in 1988 by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Prac-
tice and still in the process of implementation through various federal regulations, most
domestic banks must include letters of credit when calculating their risk-based capital ra-
tios. See Pawlowic, 23 UCC L J at 416-17 (cited in note 18).
" But see Brewer and Koppenhaver, 16 J Bank & Fin at 1040-45 (cited in note 71)
(presenting empirical evidence that equity markets accurately perceive and price the risk
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Similarly, guaranties can also be driven by tax considera-
tions, because the Internal Revenue Code applies different tax
rates to transactions structured as loans or guaranties, even if
the transactions are otherwise functionally equivalent.92 For in-
stance, a pure multiple-year loan is taxed according to the con-
stant-yield method, which calculates interest as a constant per-
centage of the net present value of debt owing at any given time.
This results in a flow of deductions for D and income receipts for
C that increase steadily over the life of the loan. If the loan is
guaranteed, in contrast, a portion of the interest payments are
converted into suretyship fees, which are amortized on a straight-
line basis. The guaranty form thus provides an accelerated pat-
tern of deductions and receipts.93 Many such arbitrage opportuni-
ties exist in the tax code; for instance, a separate set of rules
comes into play if the guaranty is cast in the form of an option.94
Any reduction in the parties' combined tax liability from such ar-
bitrage, however, is analogous to an externality imposed on the
Treasury and, ultimately, on other taxpayers, in that the parties
ignore such costs when deciding how to structure their transac-
tion.
Finally, the parties may cast their relationship in the form of
a guaranty in order to evade the substantive constraints of other
formal or informal regulations. One straightforward example of
such regulation would be the practical constraints imposed by
public opinion on U.S. direct government subsidies to foreign gov-
ernments such as Israel or Mexico. Under current budgetary
rules, these subsidies require accompanying tax increases or cuts
in other (probably more popular) programs. In contrast, until re-
cently federal loan guaranties to these countries have been
treated as off-budget, enabling them better to escape both public
and congressional scrutiny.95 A second example, less straightfor-
ward but in its day commercially quite significant, arises from re-
serve requirements imposed by the Federal Reserve System and
the lending limits imposed by the Comptroller of the Currency on
federally chartered banks. Under the Fed's requirements, for in-
of standby letter of credit issuance, notwithstanding the limited accounting information
currently presented about them).
See generally David S. Miller, Federal Income Tax Consequences of Guaranties: A
Comprehensive Framework for Analysis, 48 Tax Law 103, 110-44 (1994).
'3 Id at 111-12.
Id at 154-64.
See, for example, Kate Stith, Congress'Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L J 1343, 1379 &
n 176 (1988) (discussing loan guaranties as one of several "backdoor" appropriations
mechanisms); Sanford, 28 Geo Wash J Intl L & Econ at 377-80 (cited in note 25) (discuss-
ing the effect of recent budgetary reforms on lending to foreign governments).
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stance, banks must hold a certain percentage of their deposit ac-
count liabilities on reserve in the form of cash or deposits in one
of the Federal Reserve Banks."6 Because Fed deposits earn a
lower rate of interest than commercial loans, however, and be-
cause cash earns no interest at all, banks have a strong incentive
to lend their reserves to the limit. Until the late 1980s, the Fed
and the Comptroller did not count guaranty obligations incurred
under standby letters of credit against banks' lending limits, on
the theory that these obligations were merely contingent. The re-
sulting regulatory loopholes were a major factor in the explosion
of standby letters of credit in the 1980s, as banks constrained not
to make additional direct loans found that they could increase
their effective lending by casting a portion of such loans in the
form of guaranties.97
Notwithstanding these nonefficiency explanations for guar-
anties, I have abstracted from them in the preceding discussion
for three related reasons. First, an efficiency analysis is interest-
ing in itself and useful to both private and public actors planning
transactions. For example, even if we grant that political factors
may outweigh efficiency considerations in the packaging of for-
eign aid, it is still important to know whether it is cheaper to
provide such aid in one form rather than another. Second, a clear
analytic understanding of guaranties in efficiency terms is neces-
sary before we can address any externalities or regulatory ineffi-
ciencies that they may produce. In order to decide how to tax
guaranties, for instance, we need to know what guaranties are
and how they differ functionally from other transactions for
which they are a substitute. Third, the various nonefficiency rea-
sons for guaranties are local and contextual; they vary in detail
among industries and regulatory regimes. The basic economic ef-
ficiencies underlying guaranties, however, are general and uni-
versal. Focusing on what is general rather than on what is con-
textual allows us to use insights gleaned from one field to inform
our understanding of the others.
12 CFR §§ 204.3, 204.9 (1998).
See Barbara Bennett, Off-Balance Sheet Risk in Banking: The Case of Standby Let-
ters of Credit, Fed Res Bank of San Fran Econ Rev 19, 22-23 (1986) (concluding, however,
that real economic demand for guaranties, not capital regulations, was the primary reason
for growth in the use of standby credits). The loopholes were largely though not entirely
closed by 12 CFR §§ 32, 208.8d (1998), which subjected standby credits, appropriately dis-
counted for risk, to the same lending regulations as ordinary loans. Because the categories
for discounting such risk are imperfect, of course, a minor regulatory incentive to substi-
tute standbys for direct loans still remains.
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III. APPLICATIONS-PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
The previous Sections of this paper set out a theoretical
framework that can unify our understanding of guaranty transac-
tions across a wide variety of legal and policy contexts. This Sec-
tion shows how that framework can be applied to improve trans-
actional planning. It focuses on two extended examples: the opti-
mal design of government-provided credit assistance, and the li-
ability of commercial issuers of standby letters of credit.
In addition to providing one problem from the public policy
arena and one from private commerce, the examples illustrate
how the theory can be applied at various stages of planning and
levels of detail. The discussion of federal credit policy implicates
the broader problem of choosing a basic transactional form-that
is, should such credit assistance be provided though guaranties,
through direct government lending, or through a program of out-
right grants and subsidies? To address this broader problem, we
will need to apply the analysis of the previous Section at a gen-
eral level, seeking to identify the party who is the least-cost
monitor and enforcer, who has the lowest cost of liquidity, and
who places the highest value on a claim against the debtor. Con-
versely, the example of standby letters of credit implicates the
narrower problem of choosing the particular elements of surety-
ship that should be included in or excluded from a particular
transaction, once the basic decision has been made to use the
form of a guaranty. To address this latter problem we need to fo-
cus on more detailed considerations of comparative advantage:
what are the specific risks the transaction is meant to address,
what are the particular types of monitoring to be undertaken,
and which of the parties is best placed to bear each of these indi-
vidual obligations? One caveat is appropriate before beginning,
however: for both of these examples, the discussion that follows
merely sketches the sort of inquiry that is needed to resolve such
questions in the context of actual decisionmaking. The point of
the exercise is not to reach definitive conclusions, but rather to
set out a method by which such conclusions might ultimately be
reached.
A. The Government as Guarantor
Many government policies and expenditure programs are de-
signed with the purpose of assisting individual borrowers; benefi-
ciaries of such programs include farmers, small businesses, stu-
dents, home buyers, U.S. exporters and their foreign customers,
banks, municipalities, and independent sovereign governments.
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The scope and size of these programs, furthermore, are great. By
the end of fiscal year 1997, the federal government alone had over
$181 billion outstanding in direct loans and almost $822 billion
outstanding in guaranteed loans. When government-sponsored
enterprises are added into the mix, the total federal contribution
to the credit market exceeded $2.7 trillion in 1997, making the
federal government the largest financial institution in the. U.S.
economy.9
8
The motives for providing such credit assistance are diverse.
They range from redistribution (farm credit, urban enterprise
zones) to subsidizing purchases deemed to have some significant
public good aspect (home ownership, foreign aid) to correcting
some externality or informational failure in the relevant credit
market (deposit insurance).99 Some policies, such as support for
educational borrowing and the much-debated bailout of the
Chrysler Corporation in the late 1970s, can be defended (or at-
tacked) on all these grounds.
As we have seen, however, credit assistance can be provided
through various means. Most straightforwardly, the state could
directly subsidize interest payments, either by outright cash
transfers to borrowers or through some sort of tax expenditure.
The federal income tax deduction for residential mortgage inter-
est provides the classic example of this first strategy. °0 Alterna-
tively, the state could itself lend funds to the intended benefici-
aries at more generous terms than private creditors would be
willing to offer; the National Direct Student Loan program is the
model here. 101 And most indirectly, the state could let beneficiar-
ies borrow on the open market but assume a portion of their risk
of default by offering a guaranty, as with the Chrysler and Mex-
ico bailouts. Each of these approaches would lower the benefici-
aries' effective price of credit; from the government's perspective,
each would entail some expected cost. The payments that would
actually need to be made ex post under these three schemes,
however, could differ substantially in timing and variance.
In the areas of housing, higher education, foreign aid, and
assistance to small business, all three of these approaches have
See Analytical Perspectives-Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
1999 165, 186 (OMB 1998).
For a rigorous exposition of the information failure rationale, see N. Gregory
Mankiw, The Allocation of Credit and Financial Collapse, 101 Q J Econ 455, 463-69
(1986).
"®Alternatively, such a tax expenditure could take the form of a tax credit (refundable
or otherwise) or of deferral or exclusion of income ultimately produced by the underlying
project for which the loan is extended.
... See text accompanying notes 10-11.
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been tried over the years. More recently, however, there has been
a distinct trend away from implementing such programs through
direct expenditures and loans and toward implementing them
through guaranties. °2 Obviously, the causes of this trend may
have little to do with efficiency and much to do with politics. For
a variety of institutional reasons-some statutory, some adminis-
trative, some simply political-loans and guaranties have often
been easier to enact and implement than direct expenditures. °3
While it would be unrealistic to ignore such considerations, it
is still worth investigating the most cost-effective ways for the
government to subsidize borrowing. The choice among these
methods remains a live political issue, at least for certain catego-
ries of credit. In 1993, for instance, Congress overhauled the fed-
eral student loan program, substituting direct lending for guar-
anties.0 4 While proponents of this policy change largely justified
it on grounds of administrative efficiency, critics of the change
questioned whether these efficiencies were likely to be realized in
practice.' 5 Economic studies have since shown that in fact the net
outcome was to increase the costs of the program.0 6 A fuller
analysis that made use of our conceptual framework could have
improved the quality of the debate by helping to clarify the spe-
cific costs and benefits of these alternative transactional forms.
"See, for example, Analytical Perspectives at 185, chart 8-1 (cited in note 98) (indi-
cating that the face value of federally guaranteed loans has increased tenfold from 1970 to
1998, while the face value of federal direct loans has increased only threefold over the
same period).
'"See, for example, Stith, 97 Yale L J at 1379 n 176 (cited in note 95); Herman B.
Leonard, Checks Unbalanced: The Quiet Side of Public Spending 74-106 (Basic Books
1986) (discussing political appeal of various forms of indirect and off-budget government
credit activities, including loans and guaranties); Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Consti-
tution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 Cal L Rev 595, 608 (1988) (discussing
federal loan guaranties as a "backdoor" appropriation mechanism). Conversely, direct sub-
sidies may have a better chance of enactment if politicians can cast them in the form of
tax expenditures, which they can then characterize as tax cuts in election campaigns. See
Leonard, Checks Unbalanced at 107-11.
'"Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub L No 103-66, 107 Stat 312, 342-44
(1993), codified at 20 USC § 1087c (1994). The changeover was phased in over a five-year
period, with the result that 60 percent of federal student loans will be made on a direct
rather than a guaranteed basis in fiscal 1998. See Brody, 31 San Diego L Rev at 507 n 223
(cited in note 10).
'See Brody, 31 San Diego L Rev at 507-09 (cited in note 10).
" See Zimmerman and Miles, 47 Natl Tax J at 777-82 (cited in note 10); Miles and
Zimmerman, 50 Natl Tax J at 544-48 (cited in note 10) (finding that the federal govern-
ment overestimated the budget savings from direct lending because credit risks absorbed
by the government were ignored, budget scorekeeping rules pushed recognition of some
administrative costs beyond the five-year budget window, and potential increases in ad-
ministrative costs and government borrowing costs were ignored).
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Moreover, recent policy initiatives toward "reinventing gov-
ernment" and rationalizing the budgetary process hold out some
hope that the design of future credit assistance programs can be
evaluated on the basis of their substantive economic merits. 07 As
the sophistication of financial regulators continues to improve,
and as the private sector also develops more accurate methods of
accounting for contingent liabilities,0 " candid evaluations of the
comparative transaction costs of alternative government pro-
grams should increasingly find an audience.
Accordingly, I will use the framework established in Section
II to consider how such programs could best be structured, fo-
cusing on the specific examples of higher education, housing pur-
chases, and foreign aid. As the previous Section of this Article
demonstrated, the answer to this question turns on two key fac-
tors: the comparative costs of liquidity and of monitoring and
collecting from debtors. More specifically, if the government has
lower liquidity, monitoring, and enforcement costs than do pri-
vate lenders, then-other things being equal-direct government
loans are the most efficient means of assistance. Conversely, if
private lenders have lower liquidity, monitoring, and enforcement
costs, it is most efficient for the government to subsidize interest
payments on private loans directly. Government guaranties are
best if the government has a comparative advantage in monitor-
ing and enforcement while private lenders have an advantage in
liquidity. Finally, if the government has lower liquidity costs but
" Under the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, for instance, guaranties and other
contingent government obligations are no longer automatically treated as off-budget. Fed-
eral Credit Reform Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-508, 104 Stat 1388-610, 1388-612-1388-613,
codified as amended at 2 USCA § 661c (1997). Instead, the estimated net present value of
any new loan or guaranty, taking into account factors such as the interest rate, repayment
period, and risk of default, or of any action that alters the terms of existing loans or guar-
anties, must be reflected in the Presidents budget and go through the Congressional ap-
propriations process. 104 Stat at 1388-612. Admittedly, the Act does not apply to all fed-
eral guaranties, and specifically exempts student loans, veterans' home loans, and other
entitlement programs from its coverage. Id. Other loopholes and accounting devices that
privilege guaranties over direct expenditures still remain. See, for example, Humphrey,
Note, 17 Mich J Intl L at 196-201 (cited in note 24) (describing how the Clinton admini-
stration overcame congressional and popular opposition and succeeded in putting together
a multilateral aid package of over $51 billion, including $20 billion in currency swaps and
loan guaranties from the U.S. Treasury and Exchange Stabilization Fund); but see Zim-
merman and Miles, 47 Natl Tax J at 780 (cited in note 10) (describing how Federal Credit
Reform Act budget scorekeeping rules resulted in understating the administrative costs of
direct loans, most of which are incurred in years beyond the five-year budget window).
Nonetheless, such reforms suggest that there is some political support for closing such
loopholes and eliminating such privileges.
'See 1991 Report at 9 (cited in note 22) (comparing the government's ability to assess
risk with that of the private sector).
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higher monitoring and enforcement costs, then the government
ought to make the loans but have the private sector guarantee
them and bear the risk of default.
Let us then assess these factors in turn, starting with liquid-
ity because those costs are the same across all government credit
programs. Does the government have any comparative advantage
in liquidity? The answer is unclear. To be sure, the government
can borrow at a lower interest rate than private borrowers be-
cause its obligations are considered risk-free in debt markets. °9
In contrast, even a loan to an established bank or blue-chip cor-
poration entails some chance of default."0 This risk differential,
however, does not reflect a true difference in cost from the social
point of view. The main reason that U.S. government bonds are
deemed less risky than private bonds is that the government has
a clear and credible option that private borrowers who get into fi-
nancial trouble lack-namely, it has the power to raise funds by
levying taxes or printing money.
But these sources of revenue are far from costless. When the
government raises taxes, it imposes liquidity costs on the citizens
whose tax liabilities are increased and engenders further effi-
ciency costs in the form of deadweight loss or excess burden."'
Similarly, when the government prints money, it imposes a real
tax on owners of cash and other money balances whose holdings
are consequently devalued. Further, an inflationary policy redis-
tributes wealth from creditors whose contracts are denominated
in nominal terms to their debtors. Both of these effects lead to
'"Ignoring the risk of inflation, of course. This risk, however, can largely be eliminated
by indexing the schedule of payments for inflation or by contracting for a variable interest
rate. The U.S. Treasury Department has recently announced a plan to start selling such
indexed obligations; roughly equivalent hedges against inflation are widely available on
private financial markets. See Jeffrey M. Wrase, Inflation-Indexed Bonds: How Do They
Work?, Fed Res Bank Phila Bus Rev 3 (Jul/Aug 1997); David W. Wilcox, The Introduction
of Indexed Government Debt in the United States, 12 J Econ Perspectives 219, 220-21
(1998) (discussing the mechanics of inflation-indexed debt).
"'While it is theoretically possible that the federal government could someday default
on its general obligations, the market judges the chances of this contingency, given politi-
cal realities, to be minimal. (Recall that during the 1995-96 shutdown of the federal gov-
ernment, both Congress and officials in the executive branch took great pains to assure fi-
nancial markets that funds would be available without interruption to pay off government
bonds as they came due.) The risk of gradual repudiation of such debts through a policy of
deliberate inflation is a more serious one; still, this risk is alleviated by the institutional
structure of the Federal Reserve, a legally and politically independent agency with discre-
tion over the money supply.
' The deadweight loss or excess burden of a tax is the efficiency loss that results when
taxes induce taxpayers to substitute away from the taxed activity toward another, rela-
tively cheaper activity-for example, individuals may choose to work fewer hours under a
wage tax and save and invest less under a tax on interest income. See, for example, Har-
vey S. Rosen, Public Finance 31-32 (Irwin 3d ed 1992).
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real inefficiencies and the former reduces the liquidity of cash-
holders. In addition, both levying taxes and printing money can
have serious and adverse macroeconomic effects, crowding out in-
vestment and worsening the tradeoff between unemployment and
inflation."2 Properly calculated, then, the government's liquidity
costs include all of these potential consequences of increased bor-
rowing, discounted by their respective probabilities and their ex-
pected time of occurrence.
As a theoretical matter, if the government always acted with
perfect information and rationality, its expected cost of borrowing
would have to be lower than that of the private sector. The reason
is that the government's option to raise funds via taxes or the
printing press-like all options-has a positive expected value. If
the option turns out to be less expensive than other sources of li-
quidity, it can be exercised, while if it turns out to be more expen-
sive, it can be freely ignored. But of course, the government does
not always act perfectly when making fiscal or monetary policy.
Because of imperfect information, agency problems, the absence
of any property rights in the surpluses that could be created by
efficient policies, and other costs of administration, the option of
tax-based or money-based finance does not necessarily translate
into reduced borrowing costs. As Ronald Coase pointed out in a
different context, the transaction costs of the government's finan-
cial activities are often at least as large as the transaction costs of
the private credit market."' As a first approximation, therefore, it
is reasonable to treat the government's cost of liquidity, all things
considered, as roughly the same as that of private lenders (al-
though I recognize that the question is an empirical one and
there is room to disagree).
Turn then to the other half of our inquiry: is there reason to
think that the state can engage in monitoring and enforcement
more cheaply than private lenders? In the areas of small business
lending, student loans, and housing, such a general claim seems
problematic. Consider first the component of underwriting and
risk assessment. The available evidence suggests that, if any-
thing, government credit standards are weaker than those of the
private sector. The government's debt pool is riskier than that of
private lenders, and it tends to suffer from disproportionate de-
"For a more complete discussion of such effects of monetary and fiscal policy, see
generally Stanley Fischer, Rudiger Dornbusch, and Richard Schmalensee, Economics 493-
558 (McGraw-Hill 2d ed 1988); N. Gregory Mankiw, Macroeconomics (Worth 3d ed 1997).
"Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 17-18 (1960) (critiqu-
ing standard economic theory of market failure and offering transaction cost analysis as
the proper alternative).
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fault. Some of this risk differential, of course, stems from the ad-
verse selection that comes with being a lender of last resort. But
surveys of the government's actual credit practices tend to show
that it makes lending decisions based on less information and
less sophisticated methods of evaluation than do private lend-
ers."4 Indeed, it is hard to see how it could be otherwise. There is
no obvious capacity the government has in this regard that pri-
vate auditors lack. The latter have the advantage of greater expe-
rience, more up-to-date information technology, and the incen-
tives for honing their techniques that come from the spur of the
profit motive in a competitive market. Furthermore, many of the
government's credit assistance programs have been created as
entitlement programs, so that both legal authority and the politi-
cal atmosphere encourage leniency, not efficiency, in applying
program criteria.
With regard to supervision of the debtor during the life of the
loan and collection following default, the case for governmental
comparative advantage is more persuasive, but only marginally
so. Certainly the government, through its extensive legal powers
and the various carrots and sticks at its disposal, has the capacity
to pursue debtors more tenaciously and extract payment more ef-
fectively than private creditors; but again, these enforcement de-
vices are not free. Possibly the federal government, as a byprod-
uct of its other record-keeping activities, can more cheaply trace
debtors or their assets across state lines-an argument that has
frequently been put forward in the context of unpaid child sup-
port-but the actual costs of federal investigative and policing re-
sources, as well as the increased time and paperwork required on
the part of private citizens in order to comply with government
informational requests, would need to be more fully accounted for
in considering such a claim. The government's collection costs
could also be lower than the private sector, especially if such costs
were combined with or offset against other public collection or
payment activities. Recent proposals to use the Internal Revenue
Service to collect unpaid student loans illustrate this last possi-
bility; similar economies of scope and scale might also be achiev-
able through the welfare or Social Security systems. In this re-
gard, however, it is worth noting that the IRS has generally op-
... See, for example, 1991 Report at 9, 42 (cited in note 22) (noting that government
regulators do not have expertise in risk assessment); U.S. General Accounting Office,
High-Risk Series: Guaranteed Student Loans 30-31 (GAOHR-93-2 1992) ("[T]he inven-
tory of known problems in the [Education] Department's administration of guaranteed
student loans raises questions about its ability to adequately manage a direct lending pro-
gram.").
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posed all such proposals to draw on their enforcement re-
sources;..5 other agencies such as the Social Security Administra-
tion (or state drivers' licensing and auto registration bureaus) can
be expected to offer similar resistance. The political costs of such
policies in terms of reduced civil liberties or individual privacy, in
addition, cannot be ignored. While it might be technically possible
to use the voter registration or Selective Service systems to iden-
tify and pursue recalcitrant debtors, for instance, most people
would likely regard the associated risks of abridging fundamental
rights as unacceptably high.
In the end, accordingly, the case for public provision of such
functions must be made on a more detailed accounting of the
relative administrative costs in private and public settings. For
some types of collection, such as payroll deductions for loans
made to government employees or persons serving in the mili-
tary, the government may have a real comparative advantage.
More generally, however, proponents of bringing credit monitor-
ing services within the government sector should probably be as-
signed the burden of proof-especially in light of the unwarranted
claims of administrative efficiency that they made recently in the
area of direct student loans."16
There are two specific situations, however, where the gov-
ernment may have a real comparative advantage over private
lenders in monitoring and enforcement.
First, the government may have a comparative advantage in
contexts where it can affect the financial risk of default of the
debtor through other programs. For instance, when the federal
government extended the Chrysler guaranties in the late 1970s,
it also had several opportunities to revisit its automobile emis-
sions and fuel economy standards, as well as its negotiated policy
of voluntary export restraints that effectively placed a quota on
the number of Japanese cars sold in the United States."7 All
"'See, for example, The Income-Dependant Education Assistance Act, Hearing on HR
2336 before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education of the House Committee on
Education and Labor, 102d Cong, 2d Sess 67-90 (1992) (statement of Michael S. Bigelow,
Deputy Assistant Commissioner, IRS) (outlining the disadvantages to assigning the IRS
the responsibility for student loan collection).
116See note 10 and accompanying text. Indeed, it is not even clear that the government
is the lowest-cost supplier of the collection services it currently provides. See Adam
Melita, Note, Much Ado about $26 Million: Implications of Privatizing the Collection of De-
linquent Federal Taxes, 16 Va Tax Rev 699, 705-07, 714-26 (1997) (advocating that federal
tax collection be outsourced to private companies, and favorably assessing the results of
an IRS pilot program experimenting with such outsourcing).
17 See Robert B. Reich, Bailout: A Comparative Study in Law and Industrial Structure,
2 Yale J Reg 163, 180-87 (1985) (recounting background to and assessing impact of
Chrysler loan guaranties); Michael William Lochmann, The Japanese Voluntary Restraint
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these policies had the potential to affect Chrysler's profits signifi-
cantly by influencing its ability to compete with other auto com-
panies. When the government has the power to influence the risk
of a borrower's default in this way, private lenders face a rela-
tively high cost in monitoring and bearing that risk because they
cannot predict or control what the government does. Just as a
guaranty from a corporate manager or other insider gives the in-
sider incentives to take stronger precautions to ensure the corpo-
ration's ability to repay, so would a government guaranty provide
the government with more credible incentives to implement risk-
reducing policies and refrain from risk-increasing ones.
Whether such incentives are actually welfare-enhancing on
balance is unclear. The government's potential liability for its
guaranties may lead it to take an excessively short-term or nar-
row financial perspective, distorting its decisions on other poli-
cies. Conversely, since public decisionmaking authority is highly
decentralized, a guaranty created by one arm of the government
may not even be recognized by another arm. Absent supervisory
control by an agency like the Office of Management and Budget,
the government's ability to respond to incentives created by its
guaranties may be no greater than that of a private lender.
Furthermore, this argument threatens to swallow up the en-
tire private market for credit and force the government to stand
as a potential guarantor for all debt contracts in the economy; for
when the overall effects of fiscal and monetary policy on interest
rates and unemployment are taken into account, there is virtu-
ally no loan whose risk is not influenced by government action. It
is probably best, accordingly, to restrict the use of the argument
as a justification for government guaranties to situations, such as
the Chrysler case, in which there is an especially significant con-
nection between government actions and the risk of default.
The second situation where government guaranties may be
in order is in the foreign policy setting. Here, the government's
comparative advantage in monitoring and collection may be quite
real. For one thing, the federal government has superior access to
information relevant to the risk of default through classified ma-
terials, intelligence operations, and confidential diplomatic con-
tacts. While not all this information is available to the particular
officials who are charged with making lending decisions, those of-
ficials still have better access to it than do private lenders. More
on Automobile Exports: An Abandonment of the Free Trade Principles of the GATT and the
Free Market Principles of United States Antitrust Laws, 27 Harv Intl L J 99, 100-09 (1986)
(describing and assessing U.S. and Japanese policy toward voluntary export restraints).
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significantly, the U.S. government has more leverage than pri-
vate lenders do in the event of default. A disappointed private
creditor is for most purposes limited to calling in outstanding
loans, refusing future extensions of credit, and publicizing the
debtor's default. The U.S. government can do all of these, and
more. Because of the many dimensions in which nations interact
in the international arena, the U.S. has at its disposal a much
wider array of foreign policy tools to be used as carrots and
sticks-diplomatic concessions, reductions in informal trade bar-
riers, state visits and other gestures of political theatre, the exer-
cise of voting rights in multilateral organizations. As a result, the
U.S. government will generally find it easier and cheaper to col-
lect following a default, or to turn the default to its advantage by
trading debt forgiveness for other foreign policy concessions it
may subsequently find valuable.
As the theoretical framework of the previous Section sug-
gests, whether it is better for the U.S. government to make such
loans directly or instead to guarantee loans made by private
lenders depends upon whether its advantage in monitoring is
partial or complete. Most likely, however, this advantage is par-
tial. While the government possesses some relevant information
that private lenders lack, private lenders may conversely possess
some information that the government lacks. For instance, such
lenders may have greater expertise in project evaluation and risk
assessment, especially if the loan is intended for the purposes of
economic development or financial reform. The participation of
private lenders at the underwriting stage, moreover, also helps to
guard against the danger that the government will make an eco-
nomically unsound loan for unrelated and possibly unwarranted
political purposes. For all these reasons, then, the total costs of
such a transaction are likely to be minimized by structuring it as
a guaranty, as opposed to a direct government loan.
In contrast to these last two situations-domestic loans
whose default risks are especially influenced by government pol-
icy, and loans to foreign governments-the general efficiency case
for government direct loans or government loan guaranties seems
weak. If the state has no comparative advantage in either moni-
toring or liquidity, it should get out of the lending business. This
does not mean that the government should not support borrow-
ers; rather, it should do so through direct subsidies such as tax
deductions and credits. Indeed, carefully designing such deduc-
tions and credits could be a way of targeting them more precisely
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to those most in need.118 I suspect that the main reason for the
popularity of direct loans and loan guaranties stems not from
economic but from political considerations; more precisely, the
statutory and procedural constraints of the budgetary process de-
scribed above make guaranties the cheapest practical way to as-
sist borrowers.
It is worth discussing whether this political preference for
guaranties could be justified on second-best efficiency grounds.
After all, the constraints of the political process are real con-
straints; an economist interested in maximizing the sum of bene-
fits over costs should take them into account. Similarly, it might
be argued that choosing an inefficient transactional form can be
justified on grounds of paternalism. On this argument, if credit
assistance is sufficiently worthwhile, an inefficient program of
assistance is better than no program at all. If concealing the as-
sistance or disguising its costs by casting it in the form of a guar-
anty is the only way to get it enacted, such subterfuge is permis-
sible. Something like this seems to have been the rationale of the
Clinton administration in fashioning the recent Mexican bailout,
and perhaps also was the Bush administration's justification for
proposing Israeli loan guaranties some years earlier.
I think, however, that we must conclude that while misrep-
resenting the costs and benefits of public programs might be jus-
tifiable on pragmatic or utilitarian grounds in extreme situations,
paternalism of this sort cannot form a basis for government policy
in general. Since this Article aims to provide a general method for
policy analysis and planning, it must therefore put such consid-
erations aside. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the utilitar-
ian argument for deception by political elites is particularly weak
when used in the service of policies (such as the student loan pro-
gram) that command the support of a broad-based middle-class
constituency. Instead, this argument traditionally has been as-
serted most frequently in the setting of foreign policy, on the
grounds that the legislature-and popular opinion-structurally
underappreciates the value of expenditures on foreign assistance.
But as we have just seen, there is actually a persuasive efficiency
case for foreign loan guaranties.
"'The personal income tax provides a particularly flexible set of tools through which to
do this; credits or deductions could be limited to borrowers below a certain level of income,
could be phased out as the borrower's income rises, or could be deferred over a period of
years. See, for example, Brody, 31 San Diego L Rev at 500-07 (cited in note 10) (advocating
a system of student loans, administered through the tax system, in which the obligation to
repay would be income-contingent).
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Finally, even if the government has no comparative advan-
tage in monitoring, liquidity, or enforcement, it is still worth con-
sidering whether there is any distributional basis for choosing
among guaranties, direct loans, and interest rate subsidies. In-
deed, in some cases guaranties may have the advantage of better
targeting the benefits of government credit assistance to those
borrowers who are deemed most needy or most deserving.'19 The
benefits of interest subsidies are enjoyed by all borrowers re-
gardless of their risk of default. Guaranties and direct low inter-
est loans, in contrast, primarily benefit those borrowers who face
high costs in the private credit market. For the same reason,
guaranties and direct loans may be better at directing benefits to
marginal borrowers who could not otherwise obtain credit, while
interest subsidies are paid to marginal and inframarginal bor-
rowers (in other words, those who would be able to obtain credit
even without a subsidy) alike. This last advantage is unimportant
if the government has a full array of alternative redistributive
tools at its disposal, or if it is feasible to restrict interest subsidies
to those who could not or would not otherwise borrow. In a second
best world where efficiency and distribution must be traded off
for one another, however, this advantage cannot be ignored." °
B. The Scope of Defenses to Liability Under Standby
Letters of Credit
In recent years, an increasing proportion of commercial
guaranties have been created using the specialized device of the
standby letter of credit ("SLC").121 The SLC is modelled on the
traditional commercial letter of credit ("CLC"), under which a
buyer of goods (the applicant) engages a bank (the issuer) to
promise to pay the seller (the beneficiary) upon presentation of
... Thanks to Scott Masten for suggesting this point.
'Compare Charles W. Calomiris, Charles M. Kahn, and Stanley D. Longhofer, Hous-
ing-Finance Intervention and Private Incentives: Helping Minorities and the Poor, 26 J
Money, Credit & Bank 634, 647-48 (1994), who show that if loan applications are expen-
sive, rationing subsidies to a random subset of applicants provides a way to provide direct
assistance to the most needy. The program provides incentives for those who could obtain
credit on their own to self-select out of the program. The authors also observe that delay in
processing benefits is a common way that government benefits programs encourage such
self-selection.
" The dollar value of standby letters of credit issued by U.S. and foreign banks in-
creased from $51 billion in 1980 to $225 billion in 1986; estimates of the current out-
standing volume range between $400 and $500 billion worldwide and approximately $250
billion in the United States alone. See Boris Kozolchyk, The Financial Standby: A Sum-
mary Description of Practice and Related Legal Problems, 28 UCC L J 327, 328 & n 2
(1996).
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documents showing that the goods have been shipped.'22 Under
an SLC, an applicant D engages an issuing bank G to promise to
pay a beneficiary C upon presentation of documents averring that
an obligation that D owes to C has come due. The main difference
between an ordinary guaranty and an SLC, accordingly, is that
under the former, C must show that D is in default in order to
collect from G, while under the latter, C need only present docu-
ments averring that D is in default. But there are also many
other important differences between the two, because guaranties
are primarily governed by the common law while SLCs are gov-
erned by the relatively formalistic law of letters of credit.
The popularity of SLCs stems from three main factors. First,
because the parties are permitted to specify whatever documen-
tary conditions they wish, the device is extremely flexible. SLCs
are employed in a wide array of modern business transactions,
including real estate developments, performance bonds, sales of
corporate commercial paper, leases, private placements of securi-
ties, and public offerings of municipal debt and other securitized
assets." Second, the administrative costs of processing payment
under a letter of credit are relatively low. Under the rules of let-
ter of credit law, a beneficiary C's rights against an issuer G de-
pend only on its compliance with the documentary conditions of
the letter under which it seeks payment. The beneficiary does not
have to prove the actual fact of default, and the issuer does not
have to investigate the substance of the underlying transaction
before paying.
Third and perhaps most importantly, using an SLC permits
the role of guarantor to be played by a commercial bank. As a
'Thus, CLCs commonly are referred to as "documentary credits." Documents re-
quired under a CLC typically include invoices, packing lists, bills of lading, and the like.
For a general description of CLCs, see James J. White and Robert Summers, 3 Uniform
Commercial Code § 26-1(a) at 106-08 (West 4th ed 1995); John F. Dolan, Fundamentals of
Commercial Activity: A Lawyer's Guide 57-91 (Little, Brown 1991).
'See John F. Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit: Commercial and Standby Credits
§ 1.06 at 1-34-1-38 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont 2d ed 1991) (also surveying uses of
standby credits to support, inter alia, tax shelters, payment obligations of foreign sover-
eigns, class-action settlements, interest rate swaps, compliance with arbitral proceedings,
and the child visitation rights of a divorced parent residing in a foreign jurisdiction).
'This central aspect of the letter of credit is part of its legal definition. UCC § 5-
102(aX10) (defining "letter of credit") and § 5-102(a)(6) (defining "document), provide that
letters of credit can condition payment only on the presentation of specified records. Simi-
larly, the Comptroller of the Currency's Interpretive Ruling 7.7016, 12 CFR §7.7016
(1994), states: "As a matter of sound banking practice .... the bank must not be called
upon to determine questions of fact or law at issue between the account party and the
beneficiary." But see Kozolchyk, 28 UCC L J at 358 (cited in note 121) (indicating that
nondocumentary conditions in actual letters of credit are common, and criticizing such
practices as unsound).
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general matter, U.S. banks are prohibited by a variety of federal
and state regulations from issuing ordinary contractual guaran-
ties; under most traditional interpretations of bank charters, is-
suing a guaranty would be regarded as an ultra vires (and hence
voidable) act. 25 Traditionally, such restrictions have been justi-
fied on the grounds that guaranties do not accord with sound
banking practice and pose too great a risk to solvency.2 6 They
have also been motivated by independent political goals, such as
the populist desire to limit banks' economic power and to prevent
them from competing with other financial institutions such as
sureties and insurance companies. 1'
These restrictions on bank guaranties, however, have not
been interpreted to prevent banks from offering standby letters of
credit that are in many respects functionally equivalent to guar-
anties. In large part this result is an accident of history and of
the deliberate exploitation of regulatory loopholes. Commercial
banks' authority to issue letters of credit is well established and
uncontroversial, going back to the early days of the law mer-
chant." The law of letters of credit draws no distinction between
CLCs and SLCs. 9 And the specialized nature of the SLC un-
doubtedly made it difficult for generalist judges and regulators to
recognize its potential as a guaranty device.
The fact that historically it has been convenient to cast bank
guaranties as SLCs, however, does not imply that the default
rules of letter of credit law are well suited to modern guaranty
transactions. Indeed, it would be a surprising coincidence if they
were, given that SLCs and CLCs arise out of very different sorts
of economic exchanges, and that most of the default rules were
developed long before SLCs were invented. Accordingly, what I
propose here is to use the basic framework of Section II to deter-
mine what rules would be most appropriate in the SLC setting.
As we will see, the framework suggests that because letter of
credit law does not provide beneficiaries of SLCs with good incen-
tives to monitor their debtors or to protect the interests of issuing
' See Richard A. Lord, The No-Guaranty Rule and the Standby Letter of Credit Con-
troversy, 96 Bank L J 46, 53-58 (1979).
"'Id at 55-58.
' Id at 57. See also Bank of Michigan v Niles, 1 Doug 401, 408-10 (Mich 1844) (holding
that a Michigan statute limited the ability of state banks to acquire real estate even for
the purpose of conveying it immediately).
'See Rufus James Trimble, The Law Merchant and the Letter of Credit, 61 Harv L
Rev 981, 981-93 (1948).
'In this regard, UCC Article 5 does not even make reference to the term "standby let-
ter of credit," and does not prescribe the particular documents that might serve as a condi-
tion for drawing on a letter of credit.
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banks, parties entering into SLCs should consider developing
contractual provisions that more closely resemble the substantive
rights and duties of suretyship law.
1. Guaranties versus letters of credit: The
independence principle.
Before we begin the analysis, a brief digression into the letter
of credit literature is in order, since viewing SLCs through the
lens of guaranties will strike many specialists in the field as
anathema. In the orthodox view, the letter of credit's documen-
tary nature, which formally separates it from the underlying
transaction for which it serves as security, is deemed critical to
its commercial utility. Indeed, this feature of the letter of credit is
considered so important that it has been reified and given a spe-
cial name: the "independence principle."3 ° According to this prin-
ciple, keeping the issuer's obligation to the beneficiary independ-
ent from the underlying transaction-and from any claims the is-
suer or the applicant might have against the beneficiary arising
out of that transaction-is essential to keeping the costs of a let-
ter of credit low and its market value high."' Thus, most promi-
nent commentators on letters of credit stress that while the
standby letter might serve some of the economic functions of a
guaranty, it is not a guaranty, it is not a type of guaranty, it is a
grave analytic error to call it a guaranty, and most important of
all, it is not subject to the law of suretyship."2
Such admonitions, though expressed in the language of for-
mal legal doctrine, must of course be understood in functional
terms. If it were a defense to issuer liability that the beneficiary
had breached some substantive duty toward the applicant-such
as shipping nonconforming goods or failing to provide promised
security for its own performance-it would no longer be possible
to judge letters of credit on their face. Instead, creditors would
need to discount the value of a letter of credit by the possibility
that a substantive dispute would develop or be manufactured be-
'See Alces, 1993 U Ill Rev at 450-52 (cited in note 38); Harfield, 26 UCC L J at 196 n
2 (cited in note 18); Trimble, 61 Harv L Rev at 1006 (cited in note 128).
" The drafters of the newly revised Article 5 took pains to make this point with special
clarity. As that article's Prefatory Note states: "Revised Article 5 clearly and forcefully
states the independence of the letter of credit obligations from the underlying transactions
that was unexpressed in, but was a fundamental predicate for, the original Article 5. (Sec-
tions 5-103(d) and 5-108(f)). Certainty of payment, independent of other claims, setoffs or
other causes of action, is a core element of the commercial utility of letters of credit."
Prefatory Note, UCC § 5 ("Benefits of Revised Article 5 in General").
'See, for example, White and Summers, 3 Uniform Commercial Code § 26-2 at 112-
18 (cited in note 122); Harfield, 26 UCO L J at 203 (cited in note 18).
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fore drawing. This risk would not only increase the costs of proc-
essing and paying letters of credit; it would also substantially re-
duce the beneficiary's certainty of receiving payment. 3'
In the traditional view of most commentators, applying the
common law of suretyship to SLCs would undercut their reliabil-
ity in two ways. First, as we have seen, suretyship law typically
allows guarantors to raise a broad variety of substantive defenses
to liability, including both the claims of the primary obligor and
the special suretyship defenses based on creditor actions that in-
crease the risk of default. While it is possible to contract out of
these defenses-for example, by having the guarantor waive
them in advance-such arrangements are often disfavored by
courts and regulators.' Furthermore, even when such waivers
are enforceable, arranging for them adds to the cost of the trans-
action.
Second, as a branch of the common law, suretyship law in-
corporates a variety of equitable and quasi-equitable principles
such as reasonableness, due care, waiver, estoppel, substantial
performance, and the like. These doctrines make suretyship law
much less rule-oriented, much more subject to judicial expansion
in the face of sympathetic facts, and hence much less predictable
to commercial specialists than letter of credit law. Because such
specialists and their clients are repeat players in the guaranty
game, they place high value on knowing their exact rights and
duties and avoiding interpretative disputes. From their perspec-
tive, general common law principles are not appropriate in the
letter of credit field because they would disrupt a clear and well-
functioning set of specialized usages and commercial practices.
For these reasons, representatives of issuer and beneficiary
interests fought hard-and for the most part successfully-to
keep letters of credit outside the scope of the new Restatement of
Suretyship and Guaranty. As a result of their efforts, Section 4(2)
of the Restatement explicitly excludes obligations governed by
the law of letters of credit."5 To the same end, the new 1995 revi-
'But see the standard argument in the field of negotiable instruments over protect-
ing the holder in due course, as outlined in White and Summers, 2 Uniform Commercial
Code § 17-1 at 149-51 (cited in note 122).
'See Alces, 61 NC L Rev at 660-76 (cited in note 49); LoPucki, et al, Commercial
Transactions at 514-19 (cited in note 46).
' See Restatement 3d § 4 comment c (cited in note 5) ("The reason for this exclusion is
practical. The law governing letters of credit is quite well developed, and is generally un-
derstood to govern all letters of credit, both traditional and standby. No good purpose
would be served by disturbing that state of affairs."). For an insider's account of the poli-
tics of drafting the Restatement, see Rapson, 34 Wm & Mary L Rev at 991-93 (cited in
note 2); for an analogous account of the Article 5 revision process, see James J. White, The
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sion of Article 5 goes out of its way to stress that letters of credit
constitute a distinct commercial specialty not governed by ordi-
nary principles of contract or suretyship.136 The revision also in-
troduces several innovations that are plainly intended to further
formalize the parties' rights and duties and to discourage inter-
pretative disputes.'37
Notwithstanding this doctrinal compromise, however, some
commentators continue to maintain that it was a mistake to treat
SLCs and guaranties as conceptually distinct transactions subject
to wholly separate theories of liability. Peter Alces, for instance,
has argued that the difference between the two is merely a mat-
ter of degree and that, accordingly, the compromise that excluded
SLCs from the scope of the new Restatement was unprincipled
and unjustified. 8' As he points out, because SLCs remain subject
to the defense of material fraud, and because the parties are al-
ways free to specify documentary conditions that depend on un-
derlying substance, it is incorrect to view SLCs as entirely inde-
pendent of the substantive transactions they support.139
To these arguments we may add the observation that even if
the status of the underlying transaction is irrelevant to the is-
suer's immediate duty to honor a standby letter of credit, the
transaction's status is still quite relevant to determining whether
the beneficiary is ultimately entitled to retain payments received
under that letter. Even under revised Article 5, a beneficiary C
who draws on a letter of credit impliedly warrants to the issuer G
that no material fraud or forgery has taken place and to the ap-
plicant D that the drawing does not violate the underlying
agreement between C and D. 4 ° For instance, if the underlying
contract authorizes the beneficiary to draw on the letter of credit
only upon the applicant's default, a beneficiary who drew in the
Influence of International Practice on the Revision of Article 5 of the UCC, 6 Nw J Intl L &
Bus 189, 194-208 (1995) (describing the influence of the ICC's Uniform Customs and Prac-
tice on the revision of Article 5 of the UCC).
See UCC § 5-103 comment 1 (justifying the distinction between guaranties and let-
ters of credit in terms of the independence principle and the need for certainty and speed
of payment).
'These changes include: defining good faith as mere "honesty in fact," UCC § 5-
102(a)(7), in contrast to the more equitable standard of "reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing" found in Section 2-103(1)(b) (substituting a strict compliance principle,
UCC § 5-108(a), for the doctrines of waiver and estoppel that would otherwise apply
under Section 1-103; eliminating consequential damages and, more strikingly, the duty to
mitigate damages, UCC § 5-111(a); and providing that courts must award attorneys' fees
to the prevailing party in any dispute that arises over the issuer's duty to pay, UCC § 5-
111(e)).
'See Alces, 1993 U Ill L Rev at 479-82 (cited in note 38).
Id at 472-74.
Compare revised UCC § 5-110(a) with previous UCC § 5-111 (ALI 1994).
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absence of default (or in the mistaken belief that there had been a
default) would be obligated to return any funds wrongfully ob-
tained and to make the applicant whole for any losses that had
forseeably resulted from the wrongful draw. Similarly, if a
standby letter of credit required C to present a sworn affidavit
that it had exercised its best efforts to collect from D or to levy on
his collateral, and it knowingly and falsely so swore, G would be
entitled to the return of any funds advanced on the basis of the
false affidavit. Thus, while the letter of credit places the burden
of inertia on D in the event of a substantive dispute, and while it
may force G and D to pursue C in a distant and inconvenient lo-
cation, it does not insulate C from the obligation to comply with
its substantive contractual duties.
To restate the point in somewhat stronger terms, the main
differences between standby letters of credit and guaranties are
not substantive, but procedural. The choice between the two
forms does determine who bears the burden of bringing suit on
the underlying claim, and it may affect the forum in which that
suit can be litigated, but these are only two of many factors the
parties care about. Whether payment precedes performance is an
important term in all contracts, and so is the forum where dis-
putes may be heard, but these facts do not diminish the impor-
tance of the other aspects of the deal. From the viewpoint of par-
ties allocating risk, liquidity costs, and monitoring and enforce-
ment duties, accordingly, guaranties and SLCs are analogous in
many respects.'
2. The efficient design of standby letters of credit.
With all this as background, we may now ask: what bearing
does the economic framework laid out in Section II have on this
debate? What implications does it suggest for the possible condi-
tions that might be put on the liability of letter of credit issuers?
First of all, it suggests that the independence principle sa-
cred to letter of credit specialists is ultimately just a shibboleth.
.. Indeed, the drafters of revised Article 5 conceded the analogy in their treatment of
the specific question of whether an issuer who extends funds should be subrogated to the
beneficiary's rights against the applicant. Revised Section 5-117 provides that an issuer
who honors a beneficiary's presentation, and an applicant who reimburses his issuer, will
be subrogated to the same extent that they would be under suretyship law. See UCC § 5-
117 comment 1 (specifically referencing the Restatement 3d). Prior case law, while not
unanimous on the point, tended to deny subrogation on the grounds that denial was nec-
essary to maintain the formal distinction between letters of credit and guaranties. See
generally Amelia H. Boss, Suretyship and Letters of Credit: Subrogation Revisited, 34 Wm
& Mary L Rev 1087, 1097-1127 (1993) (examining and criticizing the case law and de-
fending the approach of revised Article 5).
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While it might well be appropriate to limit issuers' defenses to li-
ability-just as it is sometimes appropriate to limit or waive
guarantors' defenses under suretyship law-any substantive dif-
ference between standby letters of credit and conventional guar-
anties ought to turn on functional differences in the nature of the
risks being allocated and on the particular monitoring, liquidity,
and enforcement obligations assigned to the various participants,
not on abstract formalisms. Furthermore, while there do exist
some functional differences between guaranties and SLCs, those
differences are less significant than the differences between SLCs
and traditional CLCs, which current law treats identically.
More specifically, the typical configuration of monitoring, en-
forcement, and liquidity costs under a standby letter of credit is
closer to that of an ordinary guaranty than to that of a traditional
CLC. This is true for two major reasons. First, as we have seen,
letter of credit specialists regard the administrative costs of pro-
cessing payment as the primary determinant of a letter's com-
mercial value. 42 This view makes good sense in the case of a tra-
ditional CLC, where the issuer expects to make payment under
the letter in ordinary course. With a standby letter of credit, how-
ever, the parties' usual expectation is that the applicant will
make good on his underlying obligation and the letter will never
need to be honored. While the specialists acknowledge this dis-
tinction (and, often, draw attention to it), most of them fail to rec-
ognize its main economic implication-that the expected costs of
payment, discounted for probability, make up a much smaller
fraction of the issuer's total costs under an SLC than under a
CLC. For SLCs, payment costs are dwarfed by the expected costs
of investigation, underwriting, monitoring, and collection, and are
thus far less important to the standby letter's commercial value.
Second, and conversely, in the event that an SLC is drawn
on, there is a much higher chance that the applicant will be un-
collectible or unwilling to pay than under a CLC. After all,
CLCs are intended to facilitate payment in an ongoing deal, while
SLCs are intended only as a backup form of payment in case a
credit transaction goes bad. While CLC applicants often pay cash
up front, prepayment is not feasible for an SLC applicant, since
the whole point of the transaction is to provide him with liquid
credit. Furthermore, because of the sorts of transactions in which
"See, for example, Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit § 3.07 at 3-25-3-36 (cited in
note 123); Kozolchyk, 28 UCC L J at 334-35, 358-59 (cited in note 121); Boss, 34 Wm &
Mary L Rev at 1092-94 (cited in note 141); UCC § 5-103 comment 1.
'See White and Summers, 3 Uniform Commercial Code § 26-1 at 110 (cited in note
122); Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit § 1.04 at 1-15-1-18 (cited in note 123).
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they are used, SLCs contain different terms and payment condi-
tions from traditional CLCs; one recent survey showed that SLCs
involve higher fees, cover larger loans, have fewer restrictions on
transfer, and provide for a much longer expiration period.' For
all these reasons, the beneficiary's incentives to monitor and to
take precautions against the applicant's default are much more
important for SLCs than for CLCs.
Admittedly, in some standby transactions the beneficiary's
ability to supervise the applicant is very limited, as in asset secu-
ritization arrangements in which an SLC allows mortgage- or
municipal bond-backed securities to be marketed to small and
distant investors.' For -many other SLCs, however, the benefici-
ary may well be in a position to do some part of the monitoring or
enforcement. For example, while a bank may have a comparative
advantage in assessing its customer's overall creditworthiness
and collecting from him in the event he defaults, it may not be
the best underwriter with regard to the line of business in which
he now proposes to invest. The bank may well lower the total ex-
pected costs of the underlying loan by assigning at least some in-
vestigation and monitoring tasks to the beneficiary C, and by
backing up that assignment with some legal consequences if
those tasks are mishandled.
The default rules and understandings of traditional letter of
credit law, however, are motivated by the needs of the traditional
CLC transaction, and do not provide beneficiaries of SLCs with
good incentives to monitor or collect from the applicant. Under a
traditional CLC, let us recall, the main task of the beneficiary is
to ship conforming goods, not to monitor the applicant's ability to
pay or keep track of his assets. The beneficiary's main incentives
to ship such goods, furthermore, do not come from the promises or
warranties it makes to the issuing bank. Material fraud in the
transaction is difficult to prove and the issuer likely will prefer to
look to the applicant for reimbursement. Rather, the beneficiary's
incentives come from the fact that f it does not present shipment
documents, such as bills of lading or inspection certificates, it will
not be paid, and that if the goods are defective it will be liable to
the applicant for breach of the underlying contract, subjecting it
to damages in its home forum. A breaching seller, furthermore, is
also likely to forfeit future business from the applicant and possi-
bly from his business acquaintances.
'See Kozolchyk, 28 UCC L J at 329 n 3, 334 (cited in note 121) (reporting autlor's
survey of practices at six major national banks).
" Id at 338-54 (describing a typical municipal bond transaction in detail).
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Under a standard SLC, in contrast, all these enforcement de-
vices are weakened. While the typical documents required to ob-
tain payment under a CLC provide independent evidence that the
beneficiary has performed its shipment obligation, the analogous
documents required under an SLC typically do not show that the
beneficiary has performed any monitoring or collection obliga-
tions. The insolvency or default of the applicant D reduces the
chance that it will pursue its legal rights against the beneficiary
C in a distant forum; it also largely eliminates the factor of future
business. Furthermore, the benefit of C's monitoring and en-
forcement efforts accrue to the issuer G, not to the applicant D;
and G has very limited rights against C under the default rules of
Article 5. At most, C is obligated not to engage in outright fraud
and not to present materially false or forged documents when
drawing on the letter. If D has defaulted due to C's negligence, G
has no recourse.
Based on the foregoing analysis, therefore, I tentatively con-
clude that Article 5's default provisions regarding liability, de-
fenses, and risk allocation are not optimally suited to the stan-
dard SLC transaction. Such a conclusion should not be regarded
as especially surprising, given that the default rules of letter of
credit law evolved well before SLCs were invented, and that the
transactions governed by SLCs have been cast in that form in
large part to evade regulatory restrictions that, while possibly
justifiable in their original historical context, are in modern fi-
nancial markets increasingly obsolete. 46 If SLCs were being de-
signed from scratch today, they might well be structured as ordi-
nary guaranties and thus be governed by the default rules of the
Restatement.'47
This conclusion does not necessarily imply, pace Professor
Alces, that Article 5 needs to be amended or that all standby let-
ters of credit should have been made subject to the new Restate-
ment. Many of Article 5's rules are default rules, after all, subject
"See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Andrew M. Rosenfield, and Robert S. Stillman, The
Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 Va L Rev 301, 301-04 (1987) (de-
scribing and defending various forms of financial deregulation that occured in the 1980s,
including the lifting of traditional restrictions on branch banking, the payment of interest
on demand deposits, and bank entry into the credit card business). See also notes 90 and
107 (describing accounting innovations implemented under the auspices of the Federal
Credit Reform Act, Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency, Basle Committee on
Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practice, and FASB).
"Although to the extent that a document labeled as an SLO includes significant non-
documentary conditions precedent to payment, it is already governed by the Restatement,
notwithstanding the intentions of its drafters. See revised UCC § 5-102 comment 6 (stat-
ing that such conditions render the document in question something other than a letter of
credit, thus excluding it from the coverage of Article 5).
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to change by the contracting parties if they choose. The process
for amending the UCC is cumbersome and, as a practical matter,
requires the substantial assent of the main interest groups af-
fected.' Furthermore, the preference of letter of credit specialists
for rules over standards and for well-established trade usages
over contextual common law principles is wholly legitimate.
The conclusion does suggest, however, that individual parties
transacting under Article 5 should give serious thought to devel-
oping contractual provisions and documentary conditions that
more closely resemble the substantive risk allocations and moni-
toring duties provided under the Restatement for standard guar-
anties. For instance, parties drafting loan contracts supported by
an SLC might consider including a covenant in their underlying
contract stating that the issuer G is to be considered a third-party
beneficiary of any promises made in the contract by the lender C
to the borrower D. Such a clause would allow G to assert D's
claims against C for breach of the underlying deal, even though G
could not independently assert any such claim under the letter of
credit. Similarly, a bank drafting a standby letter of credit might
consider including among its documentary conditions a require-
ment that the beneficiary C present a certified judgment of an in-
dependently selected arbitrator that the applicant D is actually in
default or, alternatively, that C present a sworn and signed affi-
davit stating that it has undertaken all commercially reasonable
efforts to monitor D and to maintain all rights against collateral
during the period leading up to default. Or, the bank might re-
quire affidavits with respect to underwriting and credit investiga-
tion before issuing the standby letter in the first place.
Parties who attempt to draft such arrangements, of course,
may ultimately decide that the arrangements are not worth both-
ering with, or may discover that beneficiaries are unwilling to
agree to them. But such an outcome should result only if the costs
such arrangements impose on beneficiaries exceed the savings
they create for applicants and issuers. If the beneficiaries of SLCs
do indeed have a comparative advantage in some aspects of moni-
toring, they should be more than willing to accept such provisions
in exchange for changes in other terms of the bargain that benefit
them-such as an increase in the interest rate they receive for
lending funds.
Such provisions and conditions should not be seen as objec-
tionable by bank regulators motivated by the public interest, be-
'See generally Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U Pa L Rev 595, 601-02 (1995).
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cause they would generally operate to reduce issuers' risk rather
than to increase it. In this regard, it is ironic-if not a classic ex-
ample of how regulation can lead to perverse results-that banks
originally began writing SLCs in order to evade prohibitions on
their issuance of guaranties. To the extent that the beneficiaries
of SLCs undertake duties of care to issuers, and to the extent that
issuers can enforce duties owed by beneficiaries to applicants,
bank solvency will only be strengthened. The only potential losers
would be the inefficient competitors who benefit by keeping
banks out of the guaranty business, and who would therefore lose
from free and open competition.
CONCLUSION
This Article has identified the basic economic logic underly-
ing the standard guaranty transaction, showing that a short and
simple list of principles can explain the structure and purpose of
such transactions across a wide variety of legal and policy con-
texts. To recapitulate, supplying credit entails various costs, in-
cluding monitoring costs (defined here to include such things as
investigation, risk-assessment and underwriting, and auditing),
enforcement costs (including collection, pursuit of legal process,
salvage, resale, and allowances for bad debt), liquidity costs, mis-
cellaneous administrative costs, and the time value of money. In
an ordinary direct loan, the creditor incurs all these costs and
charges the debtor for them in the form of interest. A guaranty, in
contrast, provides a way for a lender to unbundle some of the
risks of the debtor's default-together with associated monitoring
and enforcement obligations-and sell them to another party, the
guarantor. Such an arrangement makes sense if and only if the
guarantor has a comparative advantage in monitoring or en-
forcement and the original lender has a comparative advantage
in liquidity. Otherwise, it will be cheaper and more efficient for
either party-creditor or guarantor-to lend on an unconditional
basis. In cases where these conditions are met, however-or,
more precisely, where the advantages of specialization are large
enough to warrant incurring the additional transaction costs of
writing and enforcing a three-corner arrangement-such unbun-
dling can lower the total costs of making the loan, thereby creat-
ing a transactional surplus that can be shared among all three
participants.
This Article has also identified the conditions where guaran-
ties are superior, as measured by the criterion of economic effi-
ciency, to alternative three-party transactions such as straight
intermediation. The distinctive feature of a guaranty relative to
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intermediation is that the creditor buys an option to collect di-
rectly from the debtor, instead of collecting from the guarantor
and having her collect from the debtor. Granting the creditor
such an option is efficient when, and only when, the creditor
holds a comparative advantage in some aspect of monitoring or
enforcement relative to the guarantor or to the guarantor's other
creditors. Otherwise, the option will be more valuable remaining
in the guarantor's hands.
This analytic framework helps us to integrate and synthesize
a disparate body of knowledge from multiple fields of legal and
commercial practice-including, among other things, personal
property security, mortgages, negotiable instruments, corpora-
tions, letters of credit, the law of contract assignment and delega-
tion, government contracts, and federal expenditure programs
aimed at encouraging the greater availability of credit. In so do-
ing, the framework allows us to use insights from one field to cri-
tique and improve transactional planning in others. In Section
III, for instance, our framework implied that government loans
and guaranties are inefficient unless the government has some
comparative advantage in monitoring debtors. It also showed that
the default rules provided by UCC Article 5 probably do not pro-
vide an optimal mix of rights and duties in the context of standby
letters of credit.
In addition, though we did not focus on the possibility here,
the framework could be used to help clarify ambiguous transac-
tions for the purposes of other social policies or legal doctrines. As
just one illustration, under the common law Statute of Frauds,
courts have often struggled over whether to treat a given transac-
tion as a suretyship, which is subject to the formal requirement of
a signed writing, or to treat the transaction as a primary obliga-
tion of the putative guarantor, enforceable even when oral.'49 The
framework in this Article suggests a possible answer to this
problem. As we have seen, the functional essence of a guaranty is
that the creditor C (and the guarantor G) has some comparative
advantage in monitoring or collecting from the debtor D, and thus
retains the obligation and incentive, legal or practical, to engage
in such monitoring or enforcement. Conversely, if C cannot plau-
sibly be assigned any type of monitoring or enforcement obliga-
tion, the transaction is not properly a guaranty from the economic
"'On this distinction, see examples provided in Charles K, Burdick, Suretyship and
the Statute of Frauds, 20 Colum L Rev 153, 153-56 (1920); John D. Calamari, The Surety-
ship Statute of Frauds, 27 Fordham L Rev 332 (1958); 72 Am Jur 2d Statute of Frauds
§ 180 (1974) ("Tests as to Nature of Undertaking"). Thanks to Allan Axelrod for suggesting
this application.
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viewpoint, notwithstanding any decision by the parties to de-
nominate the contract as a guaranty or to formally preserve C's
right to proceed against D. This economic distinction, further-
more, accords with the functional purposes of requiring guaran-
ties but not intermediation agreements to be put into writing.
Once an intermediary G knows that she is the only person with
the capacity or incentive to engage in monitoring the debtor, she
is likely to take the prospect of responsibility for his default very
seriously. If G assumes that the ultimate creditor C will under-
take a significant portion of the risk and the associated monitor-
ing, however, she may enter into the transaction with much less
forethought. Requiring a writing in this latter case, accordingly,
promotes the overall cautionary, evidentiary, and channeling
purposes of the Statute. 50
Other extensions and potential applications of the framework
abound, for the basic principles of the guaranty contract touch
virtually every field of commerce and industry. The factors that
influence whether a guaranty is efficient, for instance, are analo-
gous to those that arise when analyzing problems of reinsurance,
financial options, trusts, and asset securitization. Similarly, the
incentive properties of suretyship are akin to those provided by
the doctrines of fraudulent conveyance law; indeed, with only a
small stretch the duties imposed on transferees by such doctrines
could be reconceived as those of a guarantor. And as the discus-
sion in Section II.A.4.b made clear, the economic structure of
guaranty relationships is analogous to that of secured credit. In
this last regard, it is also noteworthy that guaranties and secu-
rity interests are commonly used in tandem. In subsequent re-
search, it would be worth exploring the close connection between
these two devices and the extent to which they may operate as
substitutes or complements in particular instances.
Furthermore, this Article has focused almost entirely on the
problem of minimizing transaction costs for the three parties to
the potential guaranty. As the concluding discussion to Section II
indicated, however, guaranties can impose significant external
costs on competing creditors and debtors. Now that the basic eco-
nomics of the guaranty transaction have been laid out, an obvious
next step would be to consider how such third-party externalities
could best be addressed and internalized. Possibilities in this re-
'See Arthur T. Von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in
Comparative Analysis, 72 Harv L Rev 1009, 1016-17 (1959) (discussing evidentiary, cau-
tionary, channeling, and deterrent functions of the common law consideration doctrine).
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gard might include improved accounting standards, stronger fi-
nancial disclosure requirements, or a centralized filing system for
guaranties on the model of the one currently provided for security
interests under Article 9 of the UCC.
In short, the importance of the guaranty contract in law and
commerce is vast-so vast, in fact, that it is remarkable that its
incentive structure apparently has never been investigated using
the tools of the economic analysis of law. The actual amount of
economics needed for the task, furthermore, is not especially
complicated. Once one asks the basic question-why a guar-
anty?-and draws the connections between the various contexts
in which the guaranty relationship arises, the rest of the analysis
follows in fairly straightforward fashion. The primary contribu-
tion of this Article, accordingly, is to have asked the question and
drawn the connections.
